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An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged
Place of Originalist Precedent
Lee J. Strang
I. INTRODUCTION
Originalists1 over the past thirty years have constructed a
coherent, elaborate, and powerful theory of constitutional
interpretation.2 In doing so, originalism has changed to overcome
cogent criticisms lodged against it.3 However, busied with building
and defending originalism, originalists have thus far failed to fully
explain the role of precedent in constitutional interpretation.4
Recently, some originalists, including myself, have provided
explanations of the role of nonoriginalist constitutional precedent.5

 Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. Thanks to Eric Claeys, Ken
Kilbert, Lou Mulligan, Rob Natelson, Michael Rappaport, Doug Ray, Bill Richman, Lawrence
Solum, Rebecca Zietlow, participants at the University of Toledo College of Law Workshop,
participants at the 2009 Law and Society Annual Conference, participants at the 2010 Midwest
Political Science Association Annual Conference, and participants at the Ohio Junior Scholars
Workshop, for their comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank James Carty, Adi Pawar,
and Katie Pawlak for their research assistance, the University of Toledo College of Law for its
research support, and Elizabeth for her love and support.
1. By originalism, I mean the theory of constitutional interpretation which holds that
the public meaning of the Constitution’s text, when it was ratified, is its authoritative meaning.
Professor Larry Solum has argued that originalism is defined by two propositions: (1) the
fixation thesis and (2) the contribution thesis. See Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and
Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 411–12 (2009) (describing these
theses); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism is Useless 1–2 (Oct. 19, 2010) (adopting this
definition) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). My definition accords with Solum’s
theses.
2. For a broad review of the history of originalism see DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 1–89 (2005); JOHNATHAN
O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
(2005).
3. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–100, 113–16 (2004) (explaining originalism’s evolution).
4. I will use the label “constitutional precedent” for precedents that purport to
articulate the Constitution’s meaning and to apply that meaning to the facts presented by a
case.
5. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, On Text and Precedent, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 961
(2008); Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response to
Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232 (2006); Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent
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In this Article, I take the important next step and describe the status
and role of originalist precedent6 in constitutional adjudication.
It is crucial for originalists to provide a theory of originalist
precedent because, as prominent critics have argued,7 originalism—at
least at first blush—appears to run afoul of the judiciary’s deeply held
commitment to stare decisis. This tension arises, the critics argue,
because, in each new case, originalists are compelled to look beyond
precedent and freshly interpret the Constitution based solely upon its
original meaning. To make matters worse, originalists have failed to
address this powerful criticism. In this Article, I offer an originalist
response to this problem.
Originalism must provide an account of the roles originalist
precedent plays in constitutional adjudication for three primary
reasons. First, originalism, as currently articulated, has a gap—it is
not a fully developed theory of constitutional interpretation—
because it has not yet addressed the status and role of originalist
precedent. To offer a rich, robust theory of constitutional
interpretation, originalists must tackle the thorny problem of
originalist precedent.
Second, precedent plays such a central role in our legal practice
that all plausible interpretative methodologies must account for the
role of precedent in their theories. Relatedly, if originalism does not
have a role for originalist precedent, then it would dramatically
diverge from our current legal practice and lack explanatory power.
Along these lines, Professor Richard Fallon, a critic of originalism,
with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005);
Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative
Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 311, 327 (2005); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and
Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The
Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007); Stephen J. Markman,
Resisting the Ratchet, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983 (2008); John O. McGinnis & Michael
B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 803 (2009);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 289 (2005); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court In Bondage: Constitutional
Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future Of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
155, 159 (2006); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism,
Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419 (2006).
6. An originalist precedent, as I will explain in Part III, is a precedent that meets the
standard of Originalism in Good Faith. Originalism in Good Faith, in turn, provides that a
precedent is an originalist precedent if it evinces an objectively good faith attempt to articulate
and apply the Constitution’s original meaning.
7. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 43 (2001).
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has suggested that “[a]ccording to the originalist . . . approach[],
every case should furnish an occasion for judicial inquiry into the
truth about what the Constitution means. Yet the Supreme Court
patently does not function this way.”8
Third, most scholars believe that stare decisis is normatively
attractive,9 and its prominence in our legal practice suggests that its
participants do as well;10 consequently, theories of constitutional
interpretation will be more normatively attractive if they maintain a
place for stare decisis. Originalism, as well, will be more normatively
attractive if it provides a role for stare decisis.
In this Article, I show that originalism does retain a robust role
for originalist precedent, thereby enabling it to fit our legal practice
and appropriate the normative attractiveness of stare decisis. I use the
label “Interpretative and Constructive Approaches” to identify how
judges should treat originalist precedent. In brief, the Interpretative
and Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent take their
names from the two functions of originalist precedent. First, some
originalist precedent performs the epistemic role of providing
evidence of how the Constitution’s original meaning governs a case.
Second, other originalist precedent performs the metaphysical task of
creating constitutional meaning. Judges will use the Interpretative or
Constructive Approaches to originalist precedent depending on the
precedent’s function, as described in Part V.
A presumption protects the evidentiary and creative “work”
performed by originalist precedent. This presumption gives
originalist precedent its privileged place in constitutional
adjudication. By following the Interpretative and Constructive
Approaches toward originalist precedent, judges can rely on
originalist precedent and avoid the extraordinary expenditure of
resources that would be necessary to freshly evaluate every possible
constitutional issue in cases that come before them. For example, in
an Equal Protection Clause challenge to affirmative action, instead of
deciding anew whether the Clause prohibits discrimination on the

8. Id. at 43; see also Barnett, Response, supra note 5, at 1232 (“In recent years, as the
popularity of originalist interpretation has risen . . . its critics have increasingly harped on its
supposed incompatibility with the doctrine of stare decisis.”).
9. See Solum, supra note 5, at 186–201 (defending a “Neoformalist” conception of
stare decisis).
10. See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 327 (stating that “the caselaw construing the
[Constitution’s] text is . . . of critical importance”).
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basis of race, courts can rely on originalist precedent for that
proposition and move on to the novel issue raised by the case. The
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches embody this
presumption.
As importantly, the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches
resolve an ongoing quandary in originalism. On the one hand,
originalism’s core tenet is that the Constitution’s original meaning is
its authoritative meaning.11 On the other hand, Article III requires
that federal judges give significant respect to constitutional
precedent.12 How can a judge be faithful to the Constitution’s
original meaning, while at the same time give significant respect to
precedent? The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches to
originalist precedent cut that Gordian Knot. They explain how
originalist precedent is a faithful articulation and application of the
original meaning and, therefore, in following originalist precedent,
judges are faithful to both the original meaning and Article III’s
command that they give precedent significant respect.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, in Part II, I briefly review
the debate in originalism over the role of constitutional precedent. I
explain that originalists have thus far failed to describe originalist
precedent’s place in a fully explicated originalism.
Second, in Part III, I describe how participants in our legal
practice can distinguish between originalist and nonoriginalist
precedent using a standard called Originalism in Good Faith
(“OGF”). Under OGF, precedents that are objectively good faith
attempts to articulate and apply the Constitution’s original meaning,
are originalist precedents.
Third, in Part IV, I revisit the original meaning of “judicial
Power” in Article III, which requires federal judges to give
significant respect to constitutional precedent. With this background
in mind, I show that the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches
meet Article III’s mandate. In doing so, they remain faithful to the
Constitution’s original meaning, as I explain in Part V.

11. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Public Law Research Paper No.
07-24, 2008), availale at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244
(“[T]he fixation thesis is the claim that semantic content of the Constitution . . . is fixed at the
time of adoption.”); see also id. at 6–8 (describing the “contribution thesis,” which states that
the Constitution’s original meaning contributes to constitutional law).
12. Strang, supra note 5, at 447–62; see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at
823–25 (finding that federal judicial power incorporates stare decisis).
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Fourth, in the heart of the Article, Part V, I explain the roles of
originalist precedent in constitutional adjudication, described by the
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches toward precedent. The
Interpretative Approach is that originalist precedent serves the
epistemic role of providing presumptive evidence of the original
meaning and its proper application.13 The Constructive Approach is
that originalist precedent serves the creative role of determining the
defeasible content of the Constitution’s meaning.
Then, in Part VI, I explain how the Interpretative and
Constructive Approaches operate in practice. I show that originalist
precedent serves the roles of implementing the original meaning,
embedding the original meaning in constitutional law, and affecting
other areas of constitutional law through its gravitational force. In so
arguing, I will elucidate how the role of originalist precedent varies
depending on whether the context is one of constitutional
interpretation or constitutional construction.14
Lastly, in Part VII, I argue that the Interpretative and
Constructive
Approaches
increase
originalism’s
normative
attractiveness and are therefore preferable to other conceptions of
originalist precedent that do not. Part VIII concludes.
The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches offered in this
Article complete the circle of my originalist theory of precedent. In
an earlier article, I showed why and how judges should give
nonoriginalist precedent significant respect.15 In this Article, I finish
that project by showing how judges should give originalist precedent
significant respect via the Interpretative and Constructive
Approaches.

13. A handful of originalists have stated in passing that precedent “can provide epistemic
guidance in the face of uncertain original meaning.” E.g., Barnett, Response, supra note 5, at
1235. In this Article, I elaborate on that insight.
14. Stated briefly, constitutional interpretation occurs when the Constitution’s meaning
provides a determinate answer to a legal question, while constitutional construction occurs
when there is more than one answer consistent with, but not determined by the Constitution’s
meaning. In these cases, a court must construct—create—constitutional meaning to decide the
case. For example, the Commerce Clause determinatively answers, in the affirmative, the
question of whether Congress can regulate freight trains traveling across state lines. This is
constitutional interpretation. The question of whether Congress can regulate the Internet
under its Commerce Clause authority is arguably constitutional construction.
15. Strang, supra note 5, at 472–84.

1733

DO NOT DELETE

2/1/2011 7:15 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2010

II. BACKGROUND DEBATE OVER THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PRECEDENT IN ORIGINALISM: MOVING FROM NONORIGINALIST
TO ORIGINALIST PRECEDENT
A. Constitutional Precedent
Despite—or, as I shall argue, out of faithfulness to—the central
role of our written Constitution to our national legal and political
life, constitutional adjudication has many of the characteristics of our
broader common law legal practice and heritage.16 Indeed, this
affinity has prompted an appreciable number of scholars to argue
that there exist no significant differences between constitutional and
common law adjudication.17 Less controversially, most constitutional
scholars agree that constitutional precedent plays at least a significant
role in American constitutional adjudication.18 For purposes of this
Article, I need only briefly describe the commonly accepted aspects
of constitutional precedent’s roles in constitutional adjudication
because my claim is that the conception of originalist precedent I
offer sufficiently incorporates those roles.
Most importantly, precedent is a source of legal norms that
resolve or help resolve later cases.19 Of similar importance is the role
of precedent implementing the Constitution’s norms.20
Constitutional precedent also structures the Supreme Court’s
agenda, the cases it will and will not take.21 It “frame[s], inform[s],

16. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT (2008) (providing the
most recent comprehensive overview of the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication).
17. For the most widely-cited example of this genre see David Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The
Conservative Case for Precedent, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 977 (2008) (arguing that
common law constitutionalism is more normatively attractive than originalism); David A.
Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 969 (2008)
(same).
18. There is a recently-labeled school of thought, the New Doctrinalists, that focuses on
the role of legal doctrine. See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 7; Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional
Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable
Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006); Kermit Roosevelt
III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV.
1649 (2005); see also Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417 (2008) (using the ideas from the New Doctrinalists to
explain the “Dormant” Commerce Clause).
19. GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 147–53.
20. Id. at 172–76.
21. Id. at 153–55.
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and facilitate[s] a constitutional dialogue” in the nation.22 Further, it
forms constitutional structures, such as the legal system.23 Other
functions include: creating and chronicling history; educating
Americans about the Constitution; symbolizing constitutional
principles; and shaping national identity.24
B. Nonoriginalist Precedent
Originalists have offered a stunning variety of normative
foundations for originalism, which I will not detail here.25 As
originalism has matured, its proponents have begun to shift their
focus from theoretical justifications for originalism to practical issues.
Regarding the role of precedent, originalists initially focused their

22. Id. at 155–57.
23. Id. at 157–62.
24. Id. at 162–72.
25. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 54–68, 109–13 (arguing that originalism best
protects natural rights); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, & JUDICIAL REVIEW 110–59 (1999) (grounding
originalism in popular sovereignty); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our
Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 802–05 (2002) (arguing that
originalism is justified because it protects the good consequences that arise from the
Constitution’s supermajority requirements); Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible
Philosophical Traditions Within Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism Grounded in the
Central Western Philosophical Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 909, 983–97 (2005)
(arguing that originalism best secures human flourishing). Lawrence Solum has also argued
that one version of originalism, what he calls Semantic Originalism, is compatible with most
normative justifications for originalism. Solum, supra note 11, at 128–34.
Originalists argue that judges are bound by and must enforce the constitutional
text’s original meaning. The text’s original meaning is the publicly understood meaning of the
Constitution’s text when it was ratified. Judges today may access this meaning through a
primarily historical inquiry. Judges first look to the Constitution’s text and structure: what is
the term or phrase at issue and how is it used elsewhere in the Constitution? (For an excellent
discussion of this aspect of original meaning interpretation, see Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).) Judges also ascertain the meaning of the
text in contemporary linguistic practice, drawing on the text’s usage in public discourse. For
example, a judge would look at the use of the term “commerce” in the Framing and
Ratification conventions. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 313 (summarizing the Commerce
Clause’s original meaning after utilizing this source of data, among others). Judges further
review the social, cultural, philosophical, and religious background at the time.
Originalism, as a modern movement in the legal academy, began in response to the
perceived excesses of the Warren Court. During the 1970s and 1980s, originalists struggled in
a less-than-receptive legal academy to explain the basics of originalism. Originalists paid less
attention to the practical aspects of constitutional adjudication, including the role of
constitutional precedent. O’NEILL, supra note 2, at 94–132 (describing the rise of modern
originalist arguments).
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attention on the thorny problem of nonoriginalist precedent.26
Originalists did so because of the common—and powerful—
argument used against originalism: that it was fatally compromised
by the existence of well-entrenched and broadly accepted
nonoriginalist precedent.27 As Henry Paul Monaghan stated,
originalists “cannot reasonably argue that these [nonoriginalist]
transformative changes should now be judicially overthrown.”28
I have recently argued that significant respect is due
nonoriginalist constitutional precedent because of the constitutional
and societal goal of effectively pursuing the common good.29 I tied
this normative claim to the Constitution’s command in Article III.30
I then maintained that judges should overrule nonoriginalist
constitutional precedent except when doing so would gravely harm
the common good.31 Other originalist scholars have similarly begun
to offer explanations of the status of nonoriginalist precedent.32 In
this Article, I take the next step and describe the role of originalist
precedent. The arguments in this Article therefore complement and
build on my conclusions regarding nonoriginalist precedent.

26. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 23, 24 (1994) (providing the first explicit discussion of nonoriginalist precedent).
27. See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 7, at 3 (“As I argue at length, the originalist model
departs radically from actual Supreme Court practice. As originalists themselves acknowledge,
doctrines that are of central importance in contemporary constitutional law could not be
justified on originalist grounds.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 133–34 (1991) (“[F]aithful
adherents to original understanding face an inescapable dilemma[: t]hey either can strive to
overrule the better part of constitutional doctrine and thereby thrust the world of
constitutional law into turmoil, or they must abandon original understanding in numerous
substantive areas in order to stabilize constitutional law.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
28. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 723, 739 (1988).
29. Strang, supra note 5, at 419. I describe the standard of Originalism in Good Faith
infra Part III.C, to distinguish between originalist and nonoriginalist precedents. This
standard is different from the one I used in An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism,
Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, and I intend Originalism in Good Faith to
supersede my prior thoughts on this subject.
30. Id. at 420.
31. Id. at 419.
32. See sources cited, supra note 5. Professor Randy Barnett, with his characteristically
incisive pen, has labeled those originalists who argue that originalism, properly understood,
incorporates some form of stare decisis, “faint-hearted originalists.” Barnett, Response, supra
note 5, at 1232. Others, including himself, whom he labels “fearless originalists,” largely reject
stare decisis in constitutional interpretation. Id. at 1233.
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C. Originalist Precedent

A priori, there are three plausible conceptions of the status and
role of originalist precedent in constitutional adjudication33: (1)
originalist precedent plays no role in later courts’ analyses (the “get
rid of it all” conception);34 (2) originalist precedent plays a role in
later courts’ analyses—it influences the later courts’ decisions (the
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches); and (3) originalist
precedent entirely or substantially determines the outcomes of later
courts’
analyses
(the
“common
law
constitutionalism”
conception35).36 According to the “get rid of it all” conception, in
each case presenting a question of constitutional meaning, the court
must de novo re-evaluate the Constitution’s original meaning and de
novo apply that meaning to the case. The “common law
constitutionalism” conception requires a court to decide later cases
on the basis of originalist precedent without regard for the
Constitution’s original meaning. In other words, originalist
precedent’s authority is not subject to rebuttal in light of evidence
that the precedent incorrectly articulated or applied the
Constitution’s original meaning.
These first and third conceptions have their adherents.37
However, for reasons I explain below, I believe that the second
conception is the correct originalist stance. The second conception,
33. From an originalist perspective.
34. See Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: Four Questions and Answers,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1208 (2008) (giving, as one of four possible meanings of
stare decisis, that courts have “no obligation to adhere to decisions they disagree with”).
35. I intend this label to invoke Professor David Strauss’ theory of constitutional
interpretation. Strauss, supra note 17; cf. Healy, supra note 34, at 1208–09 (noting the
position that precedents have a “strong presumption” in their favor).
36. See Steven G. Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 947, 947 (2008) (distinguishing between doctrinalists, who follow precedent, and
documentarians, who primarily follow the Constitution’s text); Healy, supra note 34, at 1174
(dividing scholarly responses to stare decisis in constitutional adjudication into three categories:
scholars who argue that stare decisis is constitutionally required; scholars who argue that stare
decisis is unconstitutional; and scholars who argue that Congress has the authority to
determine the extent of stare decisis).
37. Compare Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of
Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86
N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1210–11 (2008) (arguing that precedent can play a limited informational
role, but that it does not have independent authority), with Lash, supra note 5, at 1441–42
(arguing that an originalism justified by popular sovereignty maintains a role for precedent),
and Solum, supra note 5, at 186–201 (advocating a “neoformalist” conception of
constitutional stare decisis that significantly binds the Supreme Court).
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what I label the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches toward
originalist precedent, requires federal judges to give significant
respect to originalist precedent in the form of presumptive authority
in later cases. I designate this position the Interpretative and
Constructive Approaches because of the primary roles originalist
precedent plays under this conception. One is epistemic: originalist
precedent bridges the analytic gap between the Constitution’s
metaphysically determinate original meaning and the facts presented
in a concrete case; and the other is metaphysical: originalist
precedent determines the content of the Constitution’s norms when
the
Constitution’s
original
meaning
is
metaphysically
indeterminate.38
As I noted earlier, originalists have not focused on the role of
originalist precedent in constitutional adjudication. I have already
offered one explanation why: originalists were focused on securing
the foundations of originalism and have only recently begun to
explore other implications of originalism. One prominent example of
this phenomenon is the recent discussion on the possibility and
implications of the distinction between constitutional interpretation
and constitutional construction.39 The distinction was first proposed
in originalist literature by Robert N. Clinton in 1987.40 From there,
it was picked up and given prominence by Keith Whittington and
Randy Barnett in 1999 and 2004, respectively.41 Today, there is a
robust debate among originalists over the existence and scope of
construction.42 Similarly, originalists are beginning to turn their

38. Unless noted otherwise, I use the term indeterminate as a shorthand for both
indeterminate and underdeterminate.
39. I will discuss these concepts in greater detail later. At this point, let me say that
constitutional interpretation is the process of elaborating determinate constitutional meaning,
while construction is the creative process of fashioning constitutional meaning when the
Constitution’s meaning is indeterminate.
40. Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation
of “This Constitution”, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1264 (1987). Professor Clinton relied on an
earlier statement of the distinction in MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 20 n.* (1982).
41. WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 5–14, 42; BARNETT, supra note 3, at 118–30.
Professor Whittington also devoted a book to the subject of constitutional constructions.
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999).
42. See Solum, supra note 11, at 19–22 (detailing this divergence). Compare id. at 67–
87 (explaining constitutional construction and detailing the debate over it), with John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of
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attention to other prominent facets of our legal practice, such as
precedent.
There are other reasons why originalists have not focused on
originalist precedent. First, and perhaps most importantly, while
there is substantial criticism of originalism on the basis of
nonoriginalist precedent, there has been relatively little criticism
based on originalist precedent.43 Originalists, therefore, could afford
to focus on more pressing criticisms. Second, there is substantial
disagreement among originalists on the role of nonoriginalist
precedent, which has thus become a focus of scholarly efforts. Third,
for those originalists whose understanding of originalism includes a
role for originalist precedent, there was less incentive to explore the
subject because it was not a significant point of controversy.
III. DISTINGUISHING ORIGINALIST FROM NONORIGINALIST
PRECEDENT: ORIGINALISM IN GOOD FAITH
A. Introduction
My explanation of the functions played by originalist precedent
in constitutional adjudication depends on a distinction existing
between originalist and nonoriginalist precedent and that
participants in our legal practice have the capability to ascertain that
distinction with reasonable accuracy. Below, I explain how litigants,
judges, and scholars can access the distinction in a manner that
makes the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches toward
originalist precedent possible. After describing the two primary facets
of an originalist precedent, I describe the standard I suggest courts
should utilize: Originalism in Good Faith (“OGF”).44 Crucially, I
end by showing that precedents established using OGF enjoy a
presumption of validity in subsequent analogous cases.

Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 783–86 (2009)
(arguing for original methods originalism which may eliminate construction).
43. Professor Richard Fallon, though not focusing on originalist precedent, has strongly
criticized originalism for failing to fit our legal practice’s commitment to stare decisis. FALLON,
supra note 7, at 76–110.
44. I intend this label to invoke Steven J. Burton’s book and its thesis, that good faith
judgments by judges are what our legal practice can and should expect of them. STEVEN J.
BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH xii (1992).
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B. Distinguishing Originalist from Nonoriginalist Precedent: A First
Approximation
The distinction between originalist and nonoriginalist precedent
is, at first blush, simple to describe. The distinction is between those
cases where the Supreme Court properly interpreted—articulated—
and properly applied the Constitution’s original meaning,45 and
those precedents where it did not. Originalist precedent is, therefore,
correct, while nonoriginalist precedent is mistaken.46
For a precedent to merit the label originalist, it must first
correctly express the Constitution’s original meaning. There are a
variety of ways in which the precedent could do this, ranging from
an explicit statement of the original meaning, to an inarticulate
expression of that meaning. Examples of the first sort are relatively
easy to spot. In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court clearly
stated, following its review of the history of the Confrontation
Clause, the Clause’s original meaning: the Clause prohibited
“admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear
at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”47
Examples of precedents that state the Constitution’s original
meaning opaquely are, by definition, more difficult to identify. In
these cases, the Court does not explicitly articulate the
Constitution’s meaning, leaving one to gather the meaning from
other aspects of the opinion. For example, though the Court’s
opinion in Printz v. United States is an originalist precedent, the
precedent’s articulation of the original meaning is not
perspicacious.48 Instead, Justice Scalia’s opinion draws on the rather
ill defined “historical understanding and practice, . . . [and] the
structure of the Constitution.”49
Additionally, there are examples where the Court articulates the
Constitution’s meaning without identifying it as original meaning,
45. See GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 8 (“I understand ‘constitutional law’ to be the
byproduct of the efforts undertaken by public authorities to determine constitutional meaning
and to implement the Constitution.”).
46. This was my prior approach to the distinction between originalist and nonoriginalist
precedent. See Strang, supra note 5, at 430–31 (describing nonoriginalist precedent as
mistaken).
47. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).
48. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
49. Id.
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requiring one to determine whether the meaning articulated is the
Constitution’s original meaning. Much of the Court’s case law in the
antebellum period fits this description. The Court’s articulation of
the Constitution’s meaning in the early Republic accorded with the
acknowledged—originalist—interpretative norms of the period and
hence was unreflectively originalist. As Jonathan O’Neill and
Christopher Wolfe have demonstrated, originalism was simply the
way to interpret legal texts.50 Chief Justice Marshall’s interpretation
of the Contracts Clause in Sturges v. Crowninshield provides a good
example.51 To ascertain the “meaning of words in common use,” he
relied on the federal structure of the United States, he reviewed the
history surrounding the Framing and Ratification of the Clause, and
he noted past practices by both the states and the federal
government.52
Precedents that opaquely articulate the original meaning are
relatively rare today. This is the result of the movement toward
originalism in response to the previous hegemony of nonoriginalist
methodologies.53 Consequently, originalism was and remains
controversial on the Court.54 Its use by its proponents is explicit as a
way to show that the proponent’s result is principled (in its
proponent’s eyes) and to contrast that principled result with the
unprincipled result reached using nonoriginalist methods.
Second, in order to be an originalist precedent, it must accurately
apply the original meaning to the facts presented in the case.
Ascertaining whether a court properly applied the original meaning

50. O’NEILL, supra note 2, at 12–18 (describing the Court’s use of originalism);
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 17–72 (1986) (same); see
also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 42, at 765–72 (2009) (reviewing the historical
evidence and concluding that the method of interpretation utilized by the Framers and
Ratifiers to interpret the Constitution was originalist); Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’
Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239,
1305 (2007) (reviewing the historical record and concluding that “[t]he Founders’
hermeneutic—how they expected the Constitution to be construed—rested on the text, of
course, but also on the subjective understanding of the ratifiers. Where subjective
understanding was not retrievable, the preferred substitute was original public meaning.”).
51. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 191–208 (1819).
52. Id.
53. See O’NEILL, supra note 2, at 67–160 (giving this history).
54. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 117–32 (2005) (arguing against originalism); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS
IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005) (arguing
that originalist “fundamentalist” judges are distorting constitutional law).
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falls on a continuum, with clearly correct and incorrect applications
on each end, and in-between many cases where reasonable
disagreement exists.
The Constitution’s original meaning takes the form of legal
norms—rules, standards, and principles55—that are more abstract
than the given facts of a case.56 If the original meaning of a particular
constitutional clause is a rule, for example, then that rule provides a
norm more general than the class of fact situations to which it is
potentially applicable. Consequently, a judge deciding whether
and/or how to apply the rule must exercise judgment.
Generally, the more abstract the norm a judge is applying, the
greater the burden on the judge’s capacities to apply the norm
correctly.57 The relative ease of correctly applying the Presidential
Age Clause,58 compared with the relative difficulty of accurately
applying the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures,59 exemplifies this.
This simple statement is complicated, however, by the existence
of archetypal cases which, even within the context of an abstract
originalist norm, can make application of such a norm easier.60 For
instance, even if the Equal Protection Clause’s original meaning is a
relatively abstract principle,61 application of that principle to legal
impediments to racial minorities purchasing property would remain
an easy case. This is because one of the archetypal practices outlawed
by the Clause’s original norm was black codes which, among other
55. See Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-Principle
Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed
Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 942–56 (2009) (describing this aspect of the
Constitution’s original meaning).
56. See BURTON, supra note 44, at 28, 68 (noting that reasons are of greater abstraction
than the actions they govern).
57. See I-II, SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 94, Art. 4 (Benziger
Bros. ed., Dominican Fathers trans. 1947) (“The practical reason . . . is busied with contingent
matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is
necessity in the general principles [of natural law], the more we descend to matters of detail,
the more frequently we encounter defects.”).
58. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“neither shall any person be eligible to that
Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years”).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
60. See Strang, Originalism, supra note 55, at 956 (describing archetypal cases); see also
JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
178–95 (2001) (describing the similar concept of paradigm cases).
61. As Ronald Dworkin has asserted is the case, see RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S
LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 9–11 (1996).
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things, prevented newly-freed black Americans from buying and
selling property.62
C. Ability and Limits of Ascertaining the Distinction: Originalism in
Good Faith
1. Originalism in Good Faith as an objective standard
Originalism in Good Faith is the standard interpreters should
utilize to determine whether a precedent is originalist or
nonoriginalist. A precedent meets this standard if it is an objectively
good faith attempt to articulate and apply the Constitution’s original
meaning.
Originalism in Good Faith’s core inquiry is: does the precedent
in question show an objectively good faith attempt to articulate and
apply the Constitution’s original meaning?63 The inquiry’s focus is
primarily on the precedent itself.64 Therefore, a precedent is an
originalist precedent even if later in the author’s personal papers it
came to light that the author deceitfully, though plausibly, used
originalist arguments to reach what, in the author’s mind, was a
nonoriginalist result. The precedent remained an originalist
precedent because it plausibly articulated and applied the original
meaning.
The inquiry is focused on a precedent’s meeting the objective
standard of OGF, not on the subjective beliefs of the precedent’s
author. Continuing the previous example, a precedent whose author
subjectively believed that the precedent did not accurately articulate
or apply the original meaning, when in fact the precedent plausibly
did so, is an originalist precedent.
This makes OGF different from prominent notions of good faith
in other areas of law.65 For example, the UCC requires that parties
execute and perform contracts in good faith.66 The UCC’s definition
62. RUBENFELD, supra note 60, at 182.
63. See Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Clichés, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 493, 508 (2008)
(stating that when “prior decisions do not even purport to be based on original meaning,” the
decisions are erroneous).
64. Other data bearing on whether the precedent is an objectively good faith attempt to
articulate and apply the original meaning is also pertinent. For example, if the precedent’s
author is a well known originalist or nonoriginalist, that is relevant data, though not necessarily
of significant weight.
65. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1990).
66. Id.
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of good faith requires both “honesty in fact” and commercially
reasonable standards.67 In other words, the UCC definition of good
faith has both an objective and a subjective component.
Originalism in Good Faith, by contrast, does not delve into a
precedent’s author’s (or authors’) subjective beliefs. Instead, OGF
operates like qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects
government officials from liability if their discretionary actions were
objectively reasonable.68
Originalism in Good Faith’s objective standard is more
appropriate than a subjective standard for a number of reasons. Most
importantly, courts rarely delve into the subjective views of judges
who authored precedents, either in the context of vertical stare
decisis or horizontal stare decisis. Instead, a precedent is taken at face
value, as standing or falling on its own merits. Originalism in Good
Faith fits this practice.
Originalism in Good Faith’s objective inquiry is relatively easy to
perform because the main data—the precedent—is readily available.
By contrast, a subjective inquiry would open the possibility of
scholars and litigants delving into the nonjudicial utterances of
judges to try to show subjective bad faith. This broadening of the
inquiry would undermine Rule of Law values by undermining (what
reasonably appear to be) originalist precedents based on a judge’s
subjective views and by including in the data relevant to the law69
materials that are less accessible than the originalist precedent itself.
Relatedly, inquiry into judges’ subjective views would prove
disruptive to the judicial process because judges could be reversed
and overruled based on claims of bad faith. It would also discourage
qualified personnel from accepting judicial office because of the
intrusive search into judges’ nonjudicial writings and statements.
Judicial office itself would become more like the contentious and
invasive confirmation process.
There is also little need for a subjective standard because the
error rate of OGF will be low. An objective standard will “catch”
many precedents motivated by subjective bad faith. At the same

67. Id.
68. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We therefore hold that
government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).
69. The judge’s personal papers, for example.
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time, the objective standard is protective of precedents that evince a
plausible attempt to articulate and apply the original meaning.
Originalism in Good Faith’s objective standard is also one that
judges can meet. Although the level of effort needed to meet the
standard will vary based on the accessibility of the original meaning
and the difficulty of applying the original meaning to the question of
the case, judges have the resources to do so.
Lastly, an objective standard fulfills OGF’s goal of providing a
workable benchmark to differentiate originalist precedents from
nonoriginalist precedents. For OGF to be practicable—to preserve
the precedents’ work—the effort required to differentiate originalist
precedents from nonoriginalist precedents must be lower than that
required to conduct a de novo review of the Constitution’s original
meaning. Otherwise, the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches
would take just as much work as the “get rid of it all” conception of
originalist precedent, and my conception of precedent would
collapse into the “get rid of it all” conception. Originalism in Good
Faith avoids this pitfall by adopting an objective good faith standard
that permits participants in the legal practice to relatively easily
identify originalist precedents.
2. Measuring the objective good faith of originalist precedent
There is no set metric to ascertain whether a particular precedent
is a good faith attempt to articulate and apply the Constitution’s
original meaning. Instead, one must look for indications that the
judge acted in good faith. For example, did the judge plausibly
review the pertinent data to articulate the Constitution’s original
meaning? If not, that is a significant warning that the judge was not
in good faith articulating the original meaning. Or, did the judge
plausibly respond to credible counter-arguments put forward by the
dissent that the original meaning’s application led to a contrary
result? If not, that is a significant indication that the judge did not in
good faith apply the original meaning.
The ability of later participants in our legal practice to label a
precedent originalist will vary based on a number of factors. These
factors include: the type of analysis used in the precedent; the
interpretative commitments of the precedent’s author, if known; the
time period and interpretative milieu in which the precedent was
written; whether the precedent is prima facie consistent with the
text’s known original meaning; whether the precedent plausibly
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responds to then-available counter-arguments; and whether there are
indications that the result is inconsistent with proper application of
the articulated original meaning. In practice, the ease of determining
whether a precedent is originalist will vary. For instance, if the
precedent explicitly reviewed the text, structure, and history of the
constitutional text in question, then that weighs strongly in favor of
designating it an originalist precedent.
Originalism in Good Faith operates analogously to the
administrative review standard labeled “hard look” review.70 Hard
look review is employed when federal courts review discretionary
administrative agency determinations.71 To receive enforcement of its
action by a federal court, an administrative agency must show that its
decision-making process was reasoned: the agency took into account
all pertinent data, responded to reasonable counter-arguments, and
explained why it reached its conclusion.72 Similarly, for a precedent
to merit the label “originalist,” it should take into account the data
regarding the constitutional provision’s original meaning, explain
what original meaning results from that data, then, apply that
original meaning to the facts of the case, and in doing so, respond to
plausible counterpoints.73
3. Originalism in Good Faith is the appropriate standard to distinguish
between originalist and nonoriginalist precedent
Originalism in Good Faith is, for a number of reasons, the
appropriate standard to distinguish originalist from nonoriginalist
precedents.74 First, OGF meets the mandate of originalism because it
accords the Constitution’s original meaning authoritative status. The

70. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983) (using hard look review).
71. See 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 10.5 Hard Look (2d ed. 1997)
(“Courts have developed an expression of a limited review function, called the ‘hard look’
doctrine. This word formula is related to the arbitrariness standard and is appropriate in several
situations calling for arbitrariness type review.”).
72. Id.
73. I do not intend to suggest that the strictness of the scrutiny applied using
Originalism in Good Faith is identical to that used during hard look review. Instead, the
analogy is meant to draw out the aspects of decision-making.
74. For the reasons stated in the text, I conclude that Originalism in Good Faith is
superior to a standard that looks only to the correctness or incorrectness of a precedent, which
is commonly taken as the dividing line between originalist and nonoriginalist precedent. See
Barnett, Constitutional Clichés, supra note 63, at 509 (using the standard demarcation line).
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interpreter’s final purpose75 is the original meaning’s accurate
description and application. The interpreter tests pertinent
precedents against the original meaning to ascertain whether the
precedent is an originalist precedent.
In practice, judges who in good faith strive to articulate and
apply the Constitution’s original meaning will regularly succeed. For
this reason, it is significantly more likely that opinions written by
originalists, such as Justices Scalia76 or Thomas,77 in a self-consciously
originalist manner, will respect the original meaning, than are
opinions written in a self-consciously nonoriginalist manner by
nonoriginalists, such as Justice Douglas.78
Second, OGF accepts that precedents which meet the good faith
standard it embodies will sometimes be mistaken. Since the
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches toward originalist
precedent give originalist precedent only a presumption of
bindingness—which can be overcome—good faith mistakes will be
corrected. This prevents precedent from permanently displacing the
authoritative original meaning.79
Third, OGF sets the standard at what we should expect of judges.
If originalism is the correct method of interpreting the Constitution,

75. See ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 1013a (Hugh Tredennick trans., 1975) (describing a
subject’s final cause as the “end” and the purpose for which something exists).
76. Perhaps the best example of Justice Scalia, in good faith, articulating and applying
the Constitution’s original meaning is his majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller,
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as
Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 246 (2008) (“District of Columbia v. Heller is the most
explicitly and self-consciously originalist opinion in the history of the Supreme Court.”).
77. A good example of Justice Thomas articulating and applying the Constitution’s
original meaning in good faith is in his concurrence in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), superseded by statue, Gun Free School Zones of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(f) (1996) as recognized in U.S. v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1038
(8th Cir. 1999).
78. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“The foregoing cases
suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”); see also James A. Gardner,
State Courts as Agents of Federalism: Power and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1762 n.131 (2003) (“Justice William O. Douglas utilized a
distinctly nonoriginalist methodology in numerous cases.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism
as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1624 (1989) (“Griswold v. Connecticut [is]
usually branded by originalists as a nonoriginalist opinion.”).
79. See Kermit Roosevelt, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the
Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005) (describing “constitutional calcification,” which
occurs when judicial doctrine entirely displaces “constitutional values”).
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then judges must utilize it to fulfill their oaths.80 And their good
faith efforts to articulate and apply the original meaning are necessary
to utilize originalist interpretation.
Relatedly, OGF sets the standard at what we may, as a practical
matter, expect of judges. It is futile to require the unerring
articulation of the Constitution’s original meaning and the unerring
application of that meaning, because that standard is unattainable.
This is why Ronald Dworkin had to create the hypothetical judge,
Hercules, to exemplify his theory of law.81 As Dworkin concluded,
regarding why the flesh-and-blood humans that populate the bench
would make mistakes, “the . . . judges of the past did not all have
Hercules’ ability or insight.”82 By contrast, a good faith attempt by a
judge to articulate and apply the original meaning is attainable.
Indeed, our legal practice already demands good faith by judges.83
Of course, to meet the standard set by OGF, a precedent must
evince a good faith effort to recover and apply the Constitution’s
original meaning. Consequently, the mantle of “originalist judge”
will not, by itself, meet the standard. Instead, the authoring judge
must “do the work” of explaining the Constitution’s original
meaning and of justifying how that original meaning leads to the
judge’s conclusion. There are cases where well-known originalist
Justices have authored arguably nonoriginalist opinions. Randy
Barnett, for instance, has argued that Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
Gonzales v. Raich84 fits this description.85
Originalism in Good Faith hinges on judges exercising good
faith judgment. Like any theory of precedent, the substantive
content of precedents will hinge on the authors’ judgment of what
80. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2009); see also Nash E. Long, The
“Constitutional Remand”: Judicial Review of Constitutionally Dubious Statutes, 14 J.L. & POL.
667, 682–85 (1998) (reviewing the original meaning of the Clause).
81. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977) (“I have invented . . .
a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience, and acumen, whom I shall call Hercules.”).
82. Id. at 119.
83. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2A (2009) (“A judge
should respect and comply with the law . . . .”); id. at Canon 3A (“A judge should be faithful
to . . . the law . . . .”).
84. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33–42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing
that Congress has authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to regulate noneconomic
intrastate activities that substantially impact interstate commerce).
85. Randy E. Barnett, The Choice Between Madison and FDR, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1005, 1014 (2008); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted”
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 14–15 (2006).
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the original meaning required. For instance, in District of Columbia
v. Heller, Justice Stevens’ dissent86 plausibly reviewed the Second
Amendment’s original meaning and plausibly applied that meaning
to the facts of the case.87 Thus, Justice Stevens’ dissent meets OGF’s
requirements. If Justice Stevens could have garnered one more vote,
his dissent, and not Justice Scalia’s opinion, would have received the
deference due under OGF.88 This possibility is an unavoidable part of
practical human institutions. It also afflicts all plausible interpretative
methodologies that depend on fallible human judgment.89
4. Originalism in Good Faith distinguished from other conceptions of
originalist precedent
Originalism in Good Faith is not the first possible conception of
originalist precedent; it is not “get rid of it all.”90 Therefore, some
precedent that meets the standard of OGF will, in fact, incorrectly
articulate and/or apply the original meaning.91 However, this error
rate has minimal costs, and OGF is superior to the first position. As I
argued above, OGF’s error rate is low because it strives for and
generally produces correct precedent.92
Originalism in Good Faith is also superior to the “get rid of it
all” conception because it fits our legal practice which gives a
significant role to stare decisis. Originalism in Good Faith also
preserves the original meaning’s authority by ensuring that later
86. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id. at 2824 (“In this dissent I shall first explain why our decision in Miller was
faithful to the text of the Second Amendment and the purposes revealed in its drafting history.
I shall then comment on the postratification history of the Amendment . . . .”).
88. From my own reading of the history, Justice Stevens incorrectly articulated the
Second Amendment’s original meaning. If true, then the hypothetical majority Stevens opinion
would be an incorrect—though still originalist—precedent.
89. For example, Dworkin’s law-as-integrity methodology, which requires judges to
articulate the morally best interpretation of the pertinent legal data, places tremendous burdens
on a judge’s judgment and hence is significantly open to error. This burden is one reason why
Dworkin, like other scholars, spends a significant portion of his scholarship criticizing judicial
judgment as erroneous. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 147–48 (listing some erroneous
decisions).
90. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
91. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 836 (“It would be wonderful if
constitutional decision-makers never made any mistakes. But in the real world . . . such
mistakes are not infrequent . . . .”).
92. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (arguing that Originalism in Good
Faith gives pride of place to the Constitution’s original meaning).
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courts may overrule incorrect originalist precedents. Finally, any
uncorrected errors are likely relatively close to the correct original
meaning because the precedent qualified as an originalist precedent,
but criticism did not overcome the presumption in its favor.
Likewise, OGF is not the third possible conception of originalist
precedent; it is not the “common law constitutionalism” conception.
Consequently, OGF may—though there are significant arguments to
the contrary93—result in more instability than this third alternative.
However, OGF preserves much of the value advanced by the
“common law constitutionalism” conception by protecting
originalist precedent with a presumption. Unlike “common law
constitutionalism,” however, OGF also protects values advanced by
originalism.94
Adopting OGF means that I must revise my previous statements
regarding the demarcation between originalist and nonoriginalist
precedent. I previously argued that the distinction was synonymous
with correct and incorrect precedents.95 Under OGF, however, a
precedent may be an originalist precedent—because it met the
objective good faith standard—while at the same time being
incorrect—because the precedent incorrectly articulated and/or
incorrectly applied the original meaning. This should not be
surprising. Any requirement that asks for good faith effort from
fallible human actors, while disclaiming perfection, may result in
substantively mistaken actions.96

93. See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 326–31 (2005) (arguing that originalism provides
more stability than common law constitutionalism). The argument that the common law
constitutionalism conception is more normatively attractive because it more strongly supports
stability is especially weak when contrasted with an originalism that preserves a place for some
nonoriginalist precedent, as mine does. See Strang, supra note 5, at 442–47 (arguing that
preserving some nonoriginalist precedent serves the common good by preserving rule-of-law
values).
94. One practical import of Originalism in Good Faith and the presumption accorded
originalist precedents is that research on the Constitution’s original meaning would receive
greater prominence. See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 334 (arguing that if originalism were to
become more prominent, judges, scholars, and attorneys would quickly develop the skill set
necessary to operate effectively in that environment). The demand would be greater for
research to both confirm and rebut the presumption favoring an originalist precedent. Further,
attorneys litigating constitutional issues would focus more of their energies on originalist
arguments.
95. Strang, supra note 5, at 430.
96. Adopting Originalism in Good Faith does not substantially modify my previous
conclusions regarding nonoriginalist precedent. Previously, I argued that federal judges should
overrule constitutional precedent when it incorrectly articulated or applied the original
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Originalist precedent that meets the OGF standard is protected
by a rebuttable presumption. Litigants, scholars, and judges may
rebut the presumption by showing that (1) there is not substantial
evidence that the originalist precedent in question correctly
articulated the original meaning and/or (2) there is not substantial
evidence that the precedent correctly applied that meaning.97
The presumption in favor of originalist precedent is strong
enough that it protects originalist precedents from destabilizing
challenges and thereby prevents my conception of originalist
precedent from collapsing into the “get rid of it all” conception. At
the same time, the presumption is low enough that litigants,
scholars, and judges can effectively challenge precedents.98 This
prevents my conception from sliding into the “common law
constitutionalism” conception of precedent and, most importantly,
preserves the primacy of the Constitution’s original meaning.
The presumption gives originalist precedent its privileged place
in constitutional adjudication. It protects originalist precedent from
subsequent scrutiny and challenge. It also ensures that originalist
precedent receives the constitutionally mandated “significant
respect,” described below.
E. Summary
Originalism in Good Faith, which asks judges to faithfully
articulate and apply the Constitution’s original meaning, provides a
practical means of distinguishing originalist precedent from

meaning, unless doing so would significantly harm the common good. Originalism in Good
Faith, by contrast, requires federal judges to overrule constitutional precedent when it does not
evince an objectively good faith attempt to articulate or apply the original meaning, unless
doing so would significantly harm the common good. Stated differently, Originalism in Good
Faith somewhat reduces the class of constitutional precedents labeled nonoriginalist
precedents.
97. Thomas Healy explained a similar level of respect for precedent. See Healy, supra
note 34, at 1209 (explaining what he labels a “moderate presumption” in favor of precedent).
Randy Barnett has suggested what appears to be a lower level of respect for precedent. See
Barnett, supra note 63, at 508 (stating that “precedent can . . . play an epistemic role, placing
some burden on a court to justify its departure from prior decisions”).
98. The presumption in favor of originalist precedent is not as powerful as that
identified by Professor Caleb Nelson, “demonstrably wrong.” Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and
Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 53 (2001). My substantial-evidence
standard permits more frequent rebuttal of the presumption.
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nonoriginalist precedent. Originalism in Good Faith is also superior
to the other plausible conceptions of originalist precedent.99 Having
established a framework by which to distinguish originalist from
nonoriginalist precedent, I now explain how the Interpretative and
Constructive Approaches toward precedent fit Article III’s
requirement that federal judges give constitutional precedent
significant respect.
IV. THE INTERPRETATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES MEET
ARTICLE III’S REQUIREMENT THAT FEDERAL JUDGES GIVE
SIGNIFICANT RESPECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT
An originalist theory of precedent does not warrant the
appellation “originalist” if it does not comport with the
Constitution’s original meaning. In this Part, I briefly review the
original meaning of “judicial Power” in Article III. Article III
requires federal judges to give precedent significant respect. This is
important because it will enable me to show how the Interpretative
and Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent meet the
Constitution’s command. Hence, my conception of originalist
precedent merits the label originalist.
In a previous article, An Originalist Theory of Precedent:
Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good,100 I
conducted a broad-ranging and in-depth review of the original
meaning of “judicial Power” in Article III. I started with English
legal practice and then continued with early colonial practice,
revolutionary American practice, American practice at the time of the
Framing and Ratification, and post-Ratification practice until
1800.101 While some times and places—such as early-American
colonial practice102—were exceptional, the surprisingly consistent
legal practice was to give precedent significant respect.103

99. In Part VII, I will offer further reasons to believe that OGF is a superior conception
of originalist precedent.
100. Strang, supra note 5.
101. Id. at 447–71.
102. See id. at 452–57 (describing how, because of contingent sociological circumstances,
such as limited case reporters, the practice of precedent evolved from a weaker form of respect
for precedent to a more robust conception, like that in England).
103. See id. at 452 (“Americans had an understanding and practice of precedent, which
developed over time from the colonial era to the Ratification of the Constitution. By the time
of the Ratification, the Framers and Ratifiers understood judicial power to include stare decisis;
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I found that English legal practice was characterized by the
declaratory or evidentiary theory of precedent.104 Under this view,
precedents are not themselves the law but are instead the best
evidence of the underlying common law principles of which the
precedents are a manifestation.105 The declaratory theory of
precedent required later judges to give precedent significant respect.
Only if a precedent was “flatly absurd or unjust” could a later judge
depart from it.106
American practice prior to the Revolution, after some initial
hesitancy caused by the challenging circumstances presented by the
colonial experience, adopted the declaratory theory of precedent.107
Adherence to this traditional conception of stare decisis continued
into the Framing and Ratification period.108
During the Framing and Ratification, all references to “judicial
Power” I uncovered that referenced stare decisis or precedent, either
explicitly stated or assumed as part of a larger argument, that federal
judges would create and in turn be bound by constitutional
precedent.109 It is telling that both proponents and opponents of the
proposed constitution relied on the assumption that federal judges
would give significant respect to constitutional precedent in order to
make other, controversial arguments.
For instance, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78 argued for the
controversial proposition that Article III’s protections for federal
judges, most importantly tenure and salary protections, were
appropriate.110 To support this heavily contested portion of the
Constitution, Hamilton relied on the uncontroversial claim that
federal judges would create and, in turn, be bound by constitutional
precedent. Hamilton argued that “the records of [federal]
precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and
must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent

judges must give significant respect to prior analogous cases and must give significant reasons
for overruling precedents.”).
104. Id. at 447–52.
105. Id. This is, of course, an epistemic role for precedent.
106. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70.
107. Strang, supra note 5, at 452–57.
108. Id. at 457–62.
109. Id. at 462–67.
110. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 463–471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
2003).
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knowledge of them.”111 To entice the best lawyers to serve on the
federal bench, Hamilton contended, the Constitution properly
granted tenure and salary protections. Otherwise, few successful
attorneys would engage in the “long and laborious study” necessary
to master precedent that was the core of a federal judge’s job.112
Others made similar use of the assumption that federal judges would
give significant respect to constitutional precedent.113
Following Ratification and the creation of the new federal
judiciary, all participants in the legal practice gave precedent
significant respect. Indeed, judges, litigants, and even the court
reporters utilized precedent as one of the central tools in legal
argument.114 Alexander Dallas, for example, who was the Supreme
Court’s first reporter, regularly commented on the parties’
precedent-based arguments in notes in his reports.115
Later scholarship on this point has not challenged, and instead,
those scholarly efforts that reviewed the historical record have
supported my basic conclusions.116 For instance, Professors McGinnis
and Rappaport, after reviewing the evidence surrounding the original
meaning of judicial power, determined that “there is a strong case
for concluding that the Constitution incorporates a minimal degree
of precedent within the judicial power.”117

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Strang, supra note 5, at 462–63 (describing Anti-Federalist arguments that
relied on this assumption).
114. Id. at 467–71.
115. See, e.g., Rice v. The Polly & Kitty, 20 F. Cas. 666, 667 n.2 (D.C.D. Pa. 1789) (No.
11,754).
116. Professor Thomas Healy recently reaffirmed his prior conclusion that “judicial
Power” did not incorporate a conception of stare decisis. Healy, supra note 34, at 1180–81.
Professor Healy concluded that he and I “simply interpet[ed] the facts differently.” Id. at
1181. This is true, as far as it goes, though my claim was that my description of the history was
more accurate for many reasons, including my reconciliation of a previous scholarly divergence
on the extent to which post-Revolutionary states followed stare decisis. Strang, supra note 5, at
458–62. (In doing so, I mistakenly stated that Healy cited only two instances of overruling
domestic cases when he had cited seven such cases. Id. at 459.) I also reviewed new data to
support my conclusion including my review of pre-1800 federal court practice. Id. at 467–71.
117. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 806; see also Erica S. Weisgerber, Note,
Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO. L.J. 621,
633 (2009) (concluding that stare decisis has “constitutional status”). However, Professors
McGinnis and Rappaport find that “[t]he constitutionally required precedent rule . . . is . . .
narrow in scope.” McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 825.
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Having established that Article III requires judges to utilize
constitutional precedent and a method by which to evaluate that
precedent—OGF—I proceed below to describe the Interpretative
and Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent. I explain
how they give significant respect to precedent and enable judges to
meet Article III’s requirement. They do this by according originalist
precedent a presumption of correctness, in the case of the
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches, and, additionally, by
according defeasible bindingness in the case of the Constructive
Approach.
V. THE INTERPRETATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES
TOWARD ORIGINALIST PRECEDENT
A. Introduction
In this Part, I describe the characteristics of the Interpretative
and Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent. I tie this
conception of originalist precedent to the distinction between
constitutional interpretation and construction.118 I also show that
this conception is further supported by and derivative of the
distinction between metaphysical and epistemic determinacy. Lastly,
I tie all these points together to give a robust account of the
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches.
B. Preliminary Description of the Interpretative and Constructive
Approaches
The Interpretative Approach toward originalist precedent treats
originalist precedent—that is, precedent that meets the OGF
standard—as providing the presumptively correct articulation and
application of the Constitution’s original meaning. Judges should
utilize the Interpretative Approach when the Constitution’s original
meaning is determinate,119 and when its meaning is metaphysically
determinate but epistemically indeterminate. Originalist precedent in
this context does not create the Constitution’s governing norms, and
instead it is only an explication of the Constitution’s determinate
original meaning in a particular factual context.
118. Though, this is a reasonably contested position. See supra note 14 (discussing
originalist differences on the existence and extent of constitutional construction).
119. That is, when the meaning is both metaphysically and epistemically determinate.
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Under the Interpretative Approach, originalist precedent governs
later cases so long as the presumption in its favor remains
unrebutted. If later judges, litigants, or scholars rebut the
presumption, then the precedent loses its bindingness on later cases,
and later judges should use their own good faith judgment to
articulate and apply the Constitution’s original meaning de novo.
The Constructive Approach toward originalist precedent treats
originalist precedent as providing the defeasibly correct construction
of the Constitution’s meaning. Judges should utilize the
Constructive Approach when the Constitution’s original meaning is
metaphysically indeterminate. Originalist precedent, in this context,
creates—determines—the
Constitution’s
governing
norms.
However, the precedent’s determination of the Constitution’s
meaning is defeasible in light of a differing constitutional
construction by the elected branches, for reasons I have explained
elsewhere.120
As with the Interpretative Approach, originalist precedent that
constructs constitutional meaning is protected by a rebuttable
presumption. If later judges, litigants, or scholars show that the
Constitution’s original meaning—indeterminate though it is—
excludes the precedent’s construction, then the presumption is
overcome. Similarly, if later arguments are offered showing that the
precedent’s application of the constructed meaning is wrong, then
the presumption is overcome.
C. Distinction Between Interpretation and Construction, and Why It
Matters to Originalist Precedent
The arguments I make in this Article regarding the Interpretative
and Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent assume
the validity of the distinction between interpretation and
construction. I draw this distinction primarily from Professors
Whittington, Barnett, and Solum.121 They argue that interpretation is

120. See Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Common Good in Legal and Constitutional
Interpretation, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 48, 70–72 (2005) (making these arguments); see also
WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 7–13 (arguing that constitutional construction is a political
act of creation).
121. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 118–30 (explaining constitutional construction and
how it differs from interpretation); WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 5–14 (same); Solum,
supra note 11, at 67–87 (explaining constitutional construction and detailing the debate over
it).
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“a search for meaning already in the text,”122 while construction is
the creative “construction of meaning” to fill in gaps left after
interpretation is completed.123 I have argued elsewhere that federal
judges must enforce interpretations of the Constitution against the
contrary interpretations of the elected branches, but that they must
defer to the elected branches regarding constitutional
constructions.124 This Article follows that approach.
The distinction between interpretation and construction flows
from the distinction between determinate and indeterminate law.125
The law is determinate when its application determines the outcome
of a legal case—there is one right answer to a legal question126—
while the law is indeterminate when it limits the outcomes of a legal
case but does not mandate one outcome.127 Likewise, interpretation
is the articulation of the Constitution’s meaning, while construction
is the choosing of a meaning that is limited by the Constitution, but
not determined by it.
Originalist precedent that interprets the Constitution is binding
on subsequent analogous cases. Precedent that involves
constitutional constructions is also binding on subsequent analogous
cases. However, as I will describe below, because it involves
constructions and not interpretations, its bindingness is also
defeasible through contrary constructions by the elected branches.
The role of constitutional construction is controversial within
originalism, and many scholars have put forward thoughtful
arguments. In this Article, I avoid taking sides in that debate.
Instead, assuming that constitutional construction exists within a
fully articulated originalism, I describe the role of originalist
precedent within it.

122. WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 6.
123. Id. at 7–8.
124. Strang, supra note 5, at 439–40.
125. See id. at 439–44 (discussing the relationship between determinacy and
constitutional constructions in constitutional interpretation).
126. See id. at 426–29, 439.
127. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987).
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D. Distinction Between Epistemic and Metaphysical Legal
Determinacy, and Its Support for the Interpretative and Constructive
Approaches
Building on the previous Section’s distinction between
constitutional interpretation and construction, in this Section I show
that originalist precedent has an epistemic role in the context of
interpretation, and that it plays a metaphysical role in the context of
construction. First, however, I describe the distinction between
epistemic and metaphysical determinacy upon which my argument is
built.128 I demonstrate that the Interpretative Approach toward
originalist precedent is appropriate when the law is metaphysically
and epistemically determinate. It is also applicable when the law is
metaphysically determinate and epistemically indeterminate. The
Constructive Approach, though, applies when the Constitution’s
original meaning is metaphysically and epistemically indeterminate.
The distinction between metaphysical and epistemic legal
determinacy is, respectively, between whether the law is in fact
determinate, and whether participants in our legal practice can
ascertain whether the law is determinate.129 The law is metaphysically
determinate when there is one right answer to a case. This is true
even if participants in our legal practice are unable to ascertain what
the law is (that is, the law is epistemically indeterminate).
The law is epistemically determinate when the law is
metaphysically determinate and participants in our legal practice can
ascertain that the law is determinate.130 Our legal practice, which
aspires toward liberal legality and hence law-governed human
activity,131 aims toward epistemic determinacy.132 There is a

128. The best discussion in the law review literature on this distinction remains Ken
Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 134 (1990).
129. I do not address the question of who or what is the relevant standard for
determining epistemological determinacy and instead use the capacious phrase, “participants in
our legal practice,” to avoid the issue. I also elide the question of what level of consensus
among participants is necessary to qualify for determinacy.
130. The law can also be epistemically determinate and metaphysically indeterminate.
Stated differently, participants in our legal practice know that there is no right answer.
131. See BURTON, supra note 44, at 10 (arguing that if a judge’s judgment is not lawbound then “it may seem[] judges must resolve indeterminacies on the basis of controversial
political values—not the law.”).
132. See id. at 10–11 (arguing that “stubborn legal indeterminacy need not be
pervasive”).
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consensus, however, that it does not achieve that goal, at least not
always.133
The effort and judgment that is required to accurately ascertain
whether the law is determinate varies. In the vast majority of possible
cases—especially in “easy cases”134—the effort is minimal. By
contrast, in the subset of epistemically determinate cases where the
burdens on legal reasoning are the highest—those cases that are
close to the line of being epistemically indeterminate—the
evidentiary function of precedent under the Interpretative Approach
is most robust.135
The law is epistemically indeterminate when, despite its
metaphysical determinacy, participants in our legal practice cannot
ascertain the law’s content. Stated differently, in some cases, even
though there is “one right answer,”136 legal actors cannot discover
that answer. Part of the reason for this inability to access the law’s
determinate content are limitations imposed by the human
condition.137 Unlike Hercules, legal actors do not have—to pick just

133. See Strang, supra note 120, at 49–54 (describing the scholarship on this point).
134. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985) (explaining the
ubiquity of easy cases).
135. It is often the case that when the law is epistemically determinate it still takes
significant work to ascertain the law’s determinate content. In my own practice experience, for
instance, there was a considerable subset of cases where, to arrive at the conclusion that the law
was determinate and to learn the law’s content, I had recourse to a significant body of legal
materials. I labored over statutes, administrative regulations, cases interpreting and applying
both, and background constitutional and common law norms. My experience—that the law
can be epistemically determinate and yet that it may take great effort to arrive at that
conclusion—is supported by the work of many scholars. Dworkin’s Hercules, though
possessing greater time, research skill, and judgment than myself, utilized the same mode of
inquiry to ascertain the law’s determinate content. DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 105–06.
136. Id. at 279–90 (defending the thesis that, even in hard cases, there can be “one right
answer”).
137. This obstacle to legal determinacy is significantly lessened as access to historical
materials has become easier and with the advent of computer assisted historical searches. The
Commerce Clause’s original meaning provides a good example of this phenomenon. In 1937,
access to the Clause’s original meaning was more limited, and the only means to synthesize the
Clause’s original meaning was unaided human effort. Today, by contrast, there are numerous
electronic resources that store the historical record, and computers assist in synthesizing
original meaning. Randy Barnett’s research into the Clause exemplifies these advances. See
Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L.
REV. 847, 856 & n.32, 857 & n.35, 858–62 (2003) (describing his methodology of using
computer assisted searches of electronically available historical sources). Consequently, the
amount of epistemic indeterminacy is less today than in the past and is likely to decrease
further.
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one limitation—unlimited time to devote to ascertaining the law’s
content.138
A second reason is that law is a practical endeavor. Unlike
intellectual investigations that require theoretical reason, the goal of
which is certainty, practical inquiries often do not offer certainty.139
Instead, using practical reason, the goal is to determine which course
of action is most likely correct. This is a consequence of the subject
matter of practical reason: the thick, fact-laden, contingent occasions
of human activity.140
These concrete situations of human activity pose at least two
analytically distinct questions: (1) What ethical (or legal) norms are
pertinent to—potentially govern—this case?; and (2) What course of
conduct does the governing norm prescribe? Answering both
questions can potentially, depending on the subject, place
tremendous burdens on the judgment of the decision maker.
Analogizing to the realm of ethics, some questions are relatively
simple: one who borrows a knife from one’s neighbor to cut
vegetables must return it.141 Determining the correct course of
conduct presented by this case is relatively straight forward because
both the governing ethical norm and the manner by which that
norm governs this case are relatively clear. The governing norm is
“one must return borrowed items to their owners,” and the
hypothetical presented a paradigm example142 of that norm.
However, the thicker one makes the hypothetical by adding new
circumstances, the more difficult both analyses become, and quickly
138. See DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 105 (describing Hercules’ lack of human
limitations).
139. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note
75, at bk. II, ch. 9, 1109b19–23 (“But up to what point and to what extent a man must
deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more
than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and
the decision rests with perception.”).
140. See Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489 (1998)
(describing and defending casuistry as a mechanism to answer practical questions).
141. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2409 (1994) (“[A]ny form of . . .
keeping the property of others is against the seventh commandment . . . [including] deliberate
retention of goods lent . . . .”); I-II AQUINAS, supra note 57, Q. 66, art. 8 (stating that the
unconcealed taking of another’s property without the owner’s consent is robbery, which is
contrary to justice).
142. See ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY 251–52
(1988) (describing the concept of “paradigm cases” in the casuist tradition); Richard B. Miller,
Narrative and Casuistry: A Response to John Arras, 69 IND. L.J. 1015, 1017 (1993) (same); see
also RUBENFELD, supra note 60, at 178–95 (describing a similar concept).
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so. Continuing the previous hypothetical, assume that the neighbor
has a violent temper,143 and that he has been arguing with another
neighbor.144 It is now unclear whether the norm of returning
borrowed items governs, or whether another norm, such as “protect
innocent human life,” applies.145 Further, it is unclear the manner by
which one or both of these norms applies to the case.
Returning to the realm of law, and specifically to constitutional
interpretation, a similar phenomenon obtains because of law’s
practical orientation. Both the articulation of the Constitution’s
original meaning and how it governs a particular case will be more or
less difficult depending on the subject. As in ethics, it is sometimes
clear what the governing original meaning norm is and how it
governs a particular case. For example, the original meaning of the
Commerce Clause is fairly clear,146 and its prescription in the case of
whether Congress can regulate the transportation by rail of
commercial goods from New York to Illinois is also relatively clear.147
In many other situations, however, things are less clear. And, of
course, one of the processes—articulating the original meaning or
applying that norm—may be clear while the other is less so.
The Interpretative Approach operates when the Constitution’s
original meaning is metaphysically and epistemically determinate. In
these cases, an originalist precedent will articulate the determinate
original meaning that governs the legal questions raised by the case.
The Interpretive Approach functions most importantly when the law
is epistemically determinate and the case is difficult.
The Interpretative Approach operates as well when the
Constitution’s original meaning is metaphysically determinate but
epistemically indeterminate.148 This is because the Constitution’s
143. The neighbor lacks the virtue of temperance. See JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR
CARDINAL VIRTUES 145–206 (1966) (describing the virtue of temperance).
144. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 142, at 324–25 (giving this hypothetical).
145. Id. at 325 (“[T]he question is what relative weight one should allow the two
relevant considerations—the obligation to return a borrowed gun, and the duty to avoid being
a party to violence or homicide.”).
146. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 313 (describing the original meaning as: “to specify
how a rightful activity may be transacted . . . and the power to prohibit wrongful acts” in “the
trade or exchange of goods[,] including the means of transporting them . . . between persons
of one state and another”).
147. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (describing Congress’ power
to regulate the instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce).
148. See Barnett Response, supra note 5, at 1235 (stating that precedent “can provide
epistemic guidance in the face of uncertain original meaning”).
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meaning is determinate so that, in principle, there is a right answer.
There are obstacles to accessing that right answer which may or may
not be permanent. If or when those obstacles are removed—for
example, new research techniques permit greater access to the
original meaning—then the law would cease to be epistemically
indeterminate.
A possible example of this phenomenon is the Second
Amendment. The Amendment’s original meaning is metaphysically
determinate on the point of an individual right to keep and bear
arms.149 From the perspective of judges, prior to the early-1980s,
there was little readily available evidence of the Second
Amendment’s original meaning. At this point, then, the Second
Amendment’s original meaning was metaphysically determinate and
epistemically indeterminate. Then, beginning with Don Kates’
famous 1983 article, Handgun Prohibition and the Original
Meaning of the Second Amendment,150 a wealth of scholarship
explored the Amendment’s original meaning. This opened the
evidentiary door to the Amendment’s original meaning and made
what was once epistemically indeterminate, determinate.
By contrast, the Interpretative Approach does not operate when
the Constitution’s original meaning is metaphysically and
epistemically indeterminate. Instead, the Constructive Approach
applies, and later judges will give deference to originalist precedents
that construct constitutional meaning. In these cases, the original
meaning does not answer the question, and so the Court must create
an answer. In doing so, the Court creates constitutional meaning.
E. The Presumption in Favor of Originalist Precedent and Precedential
Drift
I noted above that originalist precedent under both the
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches is protected by a
rebuttable presumption. The presumption arises when a precedent
meets the OGF standard. This presumption gives originalist
149. See Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Jr., Under Fire: The New Consensus on the
Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1141 (1996) (“Research conducted through the
1980s has led legal scholars and historians to conclude, sometimes reluctantly, but with virtual
unanimity, that there is no tenable textual or historical argument against a broad individual
right view of the Second Amendment.”).
150. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983).
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precedent its privileged place in constitutional adjudication. The
presumption protects originalist precedent from subsequent scrutiny
and challenge. Consequently, it ensures that originalist precedent
receives the constitutionally mandated “significant respect.”
One possible challenge to my theory of originalist precedent is
that it will result in what I call precedential drift. Precedential drift
occurs when, over time, precedent builds upon itself, with the result
that the operative legal meaning of the Constitution, as articulated
by the precedent, diverges from the Constitution’s original meaning.
A possible instance of precedential drift occurred in the Supreme
Court’s Commerce Clause case law in the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries.151 During this period, most Supreme Court
Commerce Clause precedent met the standard of OGF. For example,
in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., the Court ruled that Congress’
Commerce Clause power did not extend to manufacturing.152 The
Supreme Court there applied the Clause’s original meaning.153 Yet,
as detailed by Professor Richard Epstein, the Court’s precedent
slowly expanded the operative legal meaning of what Congress could
regulate.154
The primary check on precedential drift is the rebuttability of the
presumption protecting originalist precedent. Litigants, scholars, and
judges may rebut the presumption by showing either that: (1) there
is not substantial evidence that the originalist precedent in question
correctly articulated the original meaning; and/or (2) there is not
substantial evidence that the precedent correctly applied that
meaning.155 The presumption is low enough that litigants, scholars,
or judges can effectively challenge precedents.156 This prevents
precedential drift and preserves the primacy of the Constitution’s
original meaning.157

151. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387, 1408–42 (1987) (detailing this evolution).
152. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (arguing that
“[c]ommerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it”).
153. Epstein, supra note 151, at 1408–42.
154. Id.
155. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
156. The presumption in favor of originalist precedent is not as powerful as that
identified by Professor Caleb Nelson, “demonstrably erroneous.” Nelson, supra note 98. My
substantial evidence standard permits more frequent rebuttal of the presumption than that
proposed by Professor Nelson.
157. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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F. Summary of the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches
The conception of originalist precedent put forward in this
Article fits and draws support from the distinctions between
constitutional interpretation and construction, and between
metaphysical and epistemic determinacy.158 Judges should utilize the
Interpretative Approach toward originalist precedent when the
precedent in question is interpreting the Constitution’s original
meaning. This occurs when the original meaning is metaphysically
and epistemically determinate. Judges should also apply the
Interpretative Approach when the original meaning is metaphysically
determinate and epistemically indeterminate.
In both of these situations, originalist precedent is playing an
epistemic role by articulating, in good faith, the Constitution’s
original meaning and, in good faith, applying that meaning to the
facts presented by a case. It is not creating meaning. Rather, the
precedent is putting into practice the original meaning.
As I describe concretely in Part VI, below, these precedents
provide evidence of how the original meaning controls concrete
situations. Originalist precedents subject to the Interpretative
Approach show how the gap between the Constitution’s
authoritative meaning and the conduct it governs is bridged.
Judges should apply the Constructive Approach, by contrast,
when the precedent in question is constructing constitutional
meaning. This occurs when the Constitution’s original meaning is
metaphysically indeterminate. Here, originalist precedent is playing
the metaphysical role of creating constitutional law and then
applying those norms to the facts of the case.
Originalist precedent subject to the Interpretative Approach
explains the Constitution’s resolution of particular issues presented
158. My Interpretative and Constructive Approaches to originalist precedent parallel the
distinction articulated by Professor Paul Horwitz between epistemic and legal deference. Paul
Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061 (2008). Epistemic
deference, as described by Horwitz, is deference to another because of its greater insight into
the truth of the matter. Id. at 1061. This fits my Interpretative Approach where a later
Supreme Court will defer to an earlier Court’s determination embodied in an originalist
precedent. Horwitz describes legal deference as deference to another because of the authority’s
legal standing. Id. This fits my Constructive Approach where originalist precedent subject to
the Constructive Approach receives deference, in part, simply because it is the Supreme Court’s
resolution of the case. Professor Gary Lawson has made a distinction similar to Horwitz’s. Gary
Lawson, Everything I Need to Know About Presidents I Learned from Dr. Seuss, 24 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 381, 384–86 (2001).
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in cases. It does so by specifying how the Constitution resolves
discrete legal questions, by making implicit constitutional norms
explicit, by resolving perceived tensions in the Constitution’s
meaning, and by embedding these resolutions in precedent. These
resolutions, preserved in originalist precedent, embody the
authoritative norms that govern social activity in the class of
situations analogous to the originalist precedent. Giving originalist
precedent significant respect preserves these accomplishments and
avoids leaving all questions open to re-evaluation.
Originalist precedent subject to the Constructive Approach crafts
legal norms that resolve particular issues presented in cases. These
constructed constitutional norms coordinate social activity. Giving
the constructions embodied in originalist precedent significant
respect protects the work done by the prior court in constructing the
norms, and it prevents continual attack on the precedential
resolution of issues.
G. The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches Meet Article III’s
Mandate
My theory of originalist precedent is truly originalist because it
comports with Article III’s requirement that federal judges give
precedent “significant respect.” Here, I tie Article III’s mandate to
the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches. In doing so, I
resolve the quandary of how judges can be faithful to the
Constitution’s original meaning and, at the same time, follow
precedent.
First, utilizing the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches is
faithful to the Constitution’s determinate original meaning. These
approaches give the original meaning pride-of-place by aspiring to
accurately articulate and apply the original meaning. As a practical
matter, judges who in good faith strive to articulate and apply the
Constitution’s original meaning will regularly succeed. Further, since
originalist precedent receives only a presumption of bindingness,
good faith mistakes will be corrected.
Second, the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches require
judges to follow precedent and, consequently, Article III’s
requirement. I have argued that when federal judges give originalist
precedent significant respect, they preserve the interpretative and
constructive work done by those precedents. Regarding originalist
precedent subject to the Interpretative Approach, giving those
1765
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precedents significant respect ensures that they perform their
evidentiary work of articulating the Constitution’s original meaning
and explaining how that meaning governs particular fact patterns.
For originalist precedent subject to the Constructive Approach,
significant respect preserves their creative articulation and application
of constitutional meaning.
Another way of looking at my resolution of the quandary is that
my explanation of the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches
shows why Article III’s command that federal judges give precedent
significant respect makes sense. One could argue that, in every case,
the originalist judge should retire to the original meaning and skip
any pertinent precedent; the critic could say that the originalist
precedent is adding nothing to the judge’s analysis.
In response, my conception of originalist precedent shows that
originalist precedent has two important roles: evidentiary and
creative. I have also argued that these roles are effectuated by
according originalist precedent a presumption of correctness.
Therefore, the originalist judge acts intelligently when he utilizes
originalist precedent in constitutional adjudication.
H. Conclusion
Below, in Part VI, I explain the concrete ways my conception of
originalist precedent operates. Then, in Part VII, I conclude that the
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches are more normatively
attractive than alternative conceptions of originalist precedent.
VI. PUTTING INTO PRACTICE THE CONSTITUTION’S ORIGINAL
MEANING
A. Introduction
In this Part, I explain the ways in which the Interpretative and
Constructive Approaches operate in practice. Section B discusses the
roles of originalist precedent in the context of constitutional
interpretation. Here, originalist precedent does not alter the
Constitution’s meaning and the Interpretative Approach applies.
Originalist precedent provides evidence of how the original meaning
is connected to and governs the activity under its purview. It bridges
the distance between the original meaning and the human activity
subject to the Constitution’s governance.
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Section C covers constitutional construction. Originalist
precedent in this context, in many cases, determines the
Constitution’s meaning, so the Constructive Approach governs.
These originalist precedents create the governing constitutional
norm. When the Constructive Approach applies, unlike when the
Interpretative Approach applies, the originalist precedent does more
than simply provide evidence of the Constitution’s meaning: it
constructs that meaning. In some other cases of constitutional
construction, however, the Interpretative Approach continues to
apply. I will explain when and why.
B. Constitutional Interpretation
1. Specifying the Constitution’s original meaning
By specification I mean answering a practical—here, legal—
question in the context of a concrete—here, legal—case.
Specification makes explicit how the Constitution’s original meaning
resolves a particular legal question. It identifies the relevant
constitutional norms and determines how those norms order human
actions. This is the primary practical role of originalist precedent.
Most originalist precedent fulfills this function.
Originalists argue that judges should enforce the original
meaning of the Constitution’s text, but it is an exceedingly rare case,
especially today, that turns on the simple application of the original
meaning (or, more precisely, the principle, standard, or rule,
embodied in the text’s original meaning) to the facts presented in a
case. Instead, federal courts have, from their inception, articulated
legal norms that specify159 the result in constitutional cases, thereby
reducing or eliminating the need for direct appeals to constitutional
text.
Specification is the process by which courts create constitutional
law. The creation of constitutional law and doctrine through the
process of specification is entirely legitimate—indeed, it is a necessary

159. I use the term “specify” to distinguish the activity of courts when they create
constitutional law or doctrine from what Professor Richard Fallon labels “implementing” the
Constitution, which is a broader term that, in addition, covers the creative activity of courts
when they put the Constitution into practical effect. See FALLON, supra note 7, at 5–7, 41–42
(describing implementation and distinguishing it from specification); see also Fallon, supra note
18, at 1283 (distinguishing specification from implementation).
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component of constitutional adjudication.160 A case before a court
presents a set of factual circumstances that, if a constitutional case,
implicates one or more provisions of the Constitution. The litigants
in the constitutional case each argue that the purportedly applicable
constitutional provision has a certain meaning, and they argue that
application of that meaning to the factual circumstances of the case
leads to them prevailing.
After entertaining these arguments, the court first determines the
constitutional provision’s original meaning. Second, the court applies
that meaning to the case and determines which litigant’s argument
prevails. Through this two-step process the court specifies that in
factual situations analogous to that presented by the case, a particular
result obtains. In doing so, the court announces a rule, standard, or
principle, thereby creating constitutional law. That rule, standard, or
principle guides future courts’ determinations of future, analogous,
constitutional cases. The constitutional law thereby created can come
in the form of constitutional law doctrines, tests, and formulas with
which lawyers are familiar.161
By itself, the Constitution is a “sparse collection of general
terms” that often lacks the specificity to govern a nation, especially a
complex, dynamic nation such as our own.162 Terms like
“Commerce,”163 are not self-applying, and much less are phrases like
“executive Power”164 or “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”165
The process of specification takes the meaning of the Constitution’s
general terms and phrases and creates constitutional law capable of
meeting society’s need for coordination. The more particularized
norms of constitutional law created through adjudication and found
in cases have the specificity to connect the meaning of constitutional
terms to practical situations.166 And these norms have the
determinacy to guide the conduct of society’s members to a much
160. See Fallon, supra note 18, at 1281 (arguing that the Constitution’s meaning is
frequently not an effective means of implementing the Constitution).
161. WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 6 (arguing that before the Constitution can
“impose[] obligations on the judge that are reflected in the vindication of the legal
entitlements of one party or another . . . it must be elaborated as a series of doctrines,
formulas, or tests”).
162. Id.
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
164. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
166. WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 6.
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greater degree than the constitutional text standing alone.167 Many
originalists have hinted at the need to articulate the process of
specification,168 but this is its first articulation.
The process of specification I have described is not unique to
law. Philosophy, and in particular ethics, has grappled with an
analogous situation since at least the time of Socrates.169 The fact
that most philosophical traditions in the field of ethics have
articulated means to specify how ethical norms decide concrete cases
suggests that specification in law is likewise possible.170
In the realm of practical ethics, philosophers have struggled to
articulate how human conduct can be guided by norms—by
reasons171—that are, by definition, more general than the specific
conduct they are supposed to guide. For example, one commonly
accepted norm of human conduct is “do not steal.”172 The manner
by which that norm guides specific human actions, however, is not
always clear. In the property law context, there is a veritable cottage
industry of philosophical arguments why—or why not—this norm
applies to persons who use another’s property in cases of necessity.173
Strong arguments have been advanced on both sides,174 indicating

167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 5, at 327 (“[I]t is certainly the case that many parts of
our constitutional text are worded at a high level of generality and the caselaw construing the
text is thus of critical importance.”).
169. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 142 (describing the history of how the West
has attempted to resolve concrete ethical dilemmas); see also Miller, supra note 142, at 1015
(describing some of the methods used by casuists to reduce ethical uncertainty).
170. My claims in this section, including my analogy to ethics and particularly to the
Aristotelian tradition, show that I do not accept claims that the truth of constitutional meaning
is only found in its operation. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of
Constitutional Implementation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173
(2006) (giving a pragmatic view of precedent).
171. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 102–05 (1999) (describing
human action as reason-governed).
172. Exodus 20:15 (“Thou shalt not steal.”).
173. The doctrine of necessity is where one is privileged to use another’s property
because of the need to protect one’s or another’s person or property. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 195 (1965).
174. See, e.g., II-II AQUINAS, supra note 57, Q. 66, art. 7 (“In cases of need, all things
are common property, so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another’s property for
need has made it common.”); HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES, at XI.4
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (following Aquinas’ position); William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law
and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 113 (1978) (offering a law and economics justification for
the doctrine of necessity).
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that application of the general norm—do not steal—to some
situations—those of necessity—is a challenging process.
Philosophers have articulated a number of means to apply
practical norms to particularized instances of human conduct.175
These include, for instance, creating a practical syllogism with the
general norm as the major premise, the specific conduct in question
as the minor premise, and the conclusion giving the appropriate
course of ethical conduct.176 Another method is balancing competing
reasons for and against action to determine which are of greatest
import, and acting accordingly.177 There are other methods,178 and
the existence, scope, and distinctiveness of each of these methods is
contested by philosophers.179 Regardless of the method used,
however, the philosophical consensus is that practical norms can and
do guide concrete human action.180
In law, judges face the same issue: how norms that are more
abstract than the facts presented by a case specify the correct—
legal—course of conduct of the parties in the case. The fact that
specification occurs in ethics is a powerful reason to believe that it
also occurs in law. We should not be surprised, therefore, by the
numerous aspects of our legal practice which indicate that
specification occurs in law in manners similar to ethics.181
In fully developed systems of ethics, the appropriate methods of
specification are identified, numerous intermediate norms are
articulated,182 and proper resolutions to frequent practical questions

175. See John D. Arras, Principles and Particularity: The Role of Cases in Bioethics, 69
IND. L.J. 983, 985–88 (1994) (describing different mechanisms of ethical specification).
176. ARISTOTLE, supra note 139, at bk. VI, ch. 12, 1144a; ARISTOTLE, De Anima, in
THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. III, ch. 11, at 434a16–22 (Richard McKeon ed., J.A.
Smith trans., Random House 1941) (c. 384 B.C.).
177. W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930).
178. Reasoning by analogy is a commonly identified third method of specifying the
correct course of conduct.
179. See Henry S. Richardson, Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical
Problems, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 279, 284–90 (1990) (describing the disputes). Richardson’s
piece is the classic article on specification. He defines specification on pages 295–96.
180. See David DeGrazia, Moving Forward in Bioethical Theory: Theories, Cases, and
Specified Principlism, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 511 (1992) (describing specification).
181. Tremblay, supra note 140, at 518.
182. See id. at 503–07 (describing “principlism” which is the use of generally agreedupon ethical principles as starting points of ethical judgment).
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are recognized.183 For instance, in the Aristotelian philosophical
tradition,184 significant emphasis is placed on the faculty of the
human mind known as practical reason, which enables one to specify
how one should act in a given context.185 In law, similarly, scholars
across the ideological spectrum have recognized the faculty that
enables some judges to achieve excellence in adjudication. Examples
include the legal realist Karl Llewellyn’s “situation sense,”186 and
natural lawyer Gerard Bradley’s “legal reason[].”187
Over the years, the Aristotelian tradition also has recognized a
wide array of intermediate norms. Intermediate norms are lowerlevel, more concrete instantiations of higher-level, more general
ethical principles.188 Intermediate norms are one mechanism used in
the Aristotelian tradition to bridge the decisional space between
general ethical norms and particular practical situations.189
Intermediate norms can themselves be relatively abstract, such as the
prohibition on taking innocent human life,190 which is derived from
the more abstract natural law norm of doing good and avoiding evil,
or relatively concrete such as the norm permitting killing uniformed
183. See Miller, supra note 142, at 1015 (stating that casuistry arose to overcome the
ethical uncertainty occasioned by the “uncertainty about the meaning or applicability of a
moral principle”).
184. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY:
ENCYCLOPEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 58–148 (1990) (describing the origin and
emergence of the tradition); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES
AND PUBLIC MORALITY 19–35 (1993) (describing what he labels the “central tradition”); see
also Strang, supra note 25, at 916–36 (describing the tenets of the Aristotelian tradition).
185. I-II AQUINAS, supra note 57, Q. 57, a. 4 (“[P]rudence is the right reason of things
to be done.”); see also Tremblay supra note 140, at 521–22 (describing practical reason); R.
Jay Wallace, Practical Reason, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/ (2008) (same).
186. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 60
(1960).
187. Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of
Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 251 (1991).
188. See GEORGE, supra note 171, at 52 (describing “intermediate moral principles” that
“occupy a place between the very abstract first principle and the most concrete and specific
moral injunctions”).
189. See Richardson, supra note 179, at 298 (“A mid-level norm that specifies a general
one and thereby helps mediate the latter to a concrete case serves as a bridge.”).
190. See Exodus 23: 7 (“The innocent and the just person thou shall not put to death.”);
see also I-II AQUINAS, supra note 57, Q. 100, a. 1 (“For there are certain things which the
natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done or not to be
done: e.g., . . . Thou shalt not kill.”); id. Q. 94, a. 2 (“[E]very substance seeks the preservation
of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means
of preserving human life . . . belongs to the natural law.”).
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enemy soldiers in a just war, which is itself a further specification of
the two more abstract norms just discussed.191
Through this articulation of intermediate norms, the tradition is
better able to guide practical conduct. For instance, soldiers have the
far easier task of judging whether the war in which they are fighting
is just, using the criteria set forth in the Just War Tradition, and
whether their opponents are uniformed enemy soldiers, than
whether they are “doing good and avoiding evil.”
The same three phenomena of identifying the appropriate
methods of specification, articulating numerous intermediate norms,
and recognizing resolutions to frequently-raised questions, has
occurred in our legal practice. Precedent has been the primary
mechanism of doing so. It is through originalist precedent that the
Supreme Court applies the general norms of the Constitution’s
original meaning192. Through precedent, the Court specifies how the
Constitution’s original meaning governs human conduct.
A commonly recognized facet of precedent is that the Court will
frequently articulate an intermediate legal norm. Intermediate legal
norms serve the same primary purpose as intermediate ethical norms.
They bridge the space between the relatively abstract constitutional
norms embodied in the Constitution’s original meaning and the
practical legal questions presented in cases. Legal officials, such as
lower court judges and executive officials, and citizens have less of a
burden on their judgment—and are more likely to make the right
legal judgment—if they have intermediate legal norms to guide their
conduct. The Court’s criminal procedure case law, and more
specifically the cases applying the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
on unreasonable searches and seizures, provides an important
example of this.
Our legal practice has also resolved frequently-raised questions.
These resolutions, because they are deeply embedded in precedent

191. See CATECHISM, supra note 141, § 2309 (providing the “traditional elements” of
the Just War Tradition). For a thorough review of the Tradition see GEORGE WEIGEL,
TRANQUILLITAS ORDINIS: THE PRESENT FAILURE AND FUTURE PROMISE OF AMERICAN
CATHOLIC THOUGHT ON WAR AND PEACE (1987).
192. I do not mean that the Constitution’s original meaning is always or even frequently
abstract. Instead, I am claiming only that its original meaning is relatively more abstract than
the cases it governs. From my own historical research into the original meaning of different
constitutional provisions, my tentative conclusion is that the Constitution’s original meaning is
rarely abstract and instead consists most often of relatively concrete rules and norms of
intermediate generality.
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and practice, put off-limits the resolutions to these questions. One
such seminal resolution occurred during the Marshall Court. In two
cases, the Court resolved the issue of whether, and to what extent,
the Supreme Court could review state court judgments under Article
III. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Court specified that its Article
III “judicial Power” over “Cases” included appeals from state court
civil suits.193 Five years later, in Cohens v. Virginia, the Court
specified that its “judicial Power” extended to state criminal
appeals.194 The Court’s resolutions in Martin and Cohens are
unchallengeable and have effectively specified the Constitution’s
meaning in this context.
In addition to ethics, everyday life also provides examples of
specification at work. Imagine that you are the parent in a family
with five children whose ages range from eleven to three. Assume
further that in your household there have been no written statements
regarding how you will treat your children. Instead, like in most
families, the norms you follow in parenting your children are
unwritten and rooted in religious, ethical, cultural, social, and
traditional norms.
One of the frequent areas of dispute between you and your
children is over the subject of going to their friends’ houses. The
sources of dispute are: (1) the times at which your children wish to
play at their friends’ houses; (2) the proximity (or lack thereof) of
their friends’ houses to your home; (3) the activities that will take
place at their friends’ houses; (4) the age and maturity of your child;
(5) the suitability of the friend as a friend of your child; and (6) the
suitability of the friend’s home environment for your child. Your
practice has been to balance these and other factors when one of
your children makes a request to play at a friend’s house. You
balance these factors with the purpose of maximizing your child’s
growth toward virtue.
Unfortunately for you, your children have agitated for reform in
your household for many reasons, including because they believe
that you have arbitrarily applied the factors listed above. In
particular, your children believe that you are too concerned with the
time they visit friends, and are too hostile to them playing electronic
games at their friends’ houses.

193. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
194. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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To restore household accord, you take the step of holding a
family meeting.195 You and your children agree to follow a norm
governing their play at their friends’ houses. The norm is short and
uses non-technical language. It states: “Children may play at their
friends’ houses subject to reasonable regulation in the child’s best
interest.”
After agreeing to the norm, the daily process of requests by your
children to play at their friends’ houses resumes. Your seven-yearold, Alexander, asks to play at Justin’s house. You say yes, in part
because your child is older than six. This process continues for some
time. Children request to play at their friends’ houses and you apply
the norm. In each instance, you bridge the space between the norm
and the specific facts that it governs in the form of your children’s
requests. In doing so, you specify how the norm determines these
various requests.
Next, your nine-year-old, Lucy, asks to play at Felicity’s house.
As parents will attest, one of the sources of data upon which to
decide whether to permit Lucy to play at Felicity’s house is your
prior decisions. Your prior applications of the norm provide evidence
of how the norm governs the current request.
You say no to Lucy because the factors of time and proximity
weigh heavily against playing at Felicity’s even though Lucy is older
than six. Lucy appeals to the norm. Even though the norm is
formally the provision governing this situation, she does not focus
on parsing its meaning. Instead, Lucy argues that she is older than
your seven-year-old, Alexander, who you permitted to play at
Justin’s. Lucy also marshals other “cases” to show that, like her
siblings in those cases, you should permit her to go to Felicity’s
house.
Lucy is taking the tact of many children: use analogous prior
applications of the norm to her siblings as evidence of the norm’s
meaning in her situation. She argues that, properly specified, the
norm permits her to play at Felicity’s house. The affinity of this
hypothetical to reality shows that, in everyday family life,
specification is used to resolve concrete disputes governed by
previously established norms.

195. See FRANK B. GILBRETH, JR., & ERNESTINE GILBRETH CAREY, CHEAPER BY THE
DOZEN 37 (1949) (describing how the Gilbreth children agitated for reform of family
governance which led to a family council).
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The Interpretative Approach, to summarize, describes the
evidentiary role that originalist precedent plays in a fully-developed
originalism. Originalist precedent, as in ethics and everyday life,
explicates how concrete cases are governed by the original
meaning.196 Originalist precedent is the “data” repository for later
courts looking to decide analogous concrete cases. Preserving the
work done by originalist precedent is why Article III requires federal
judges to give significant respect to constitutional precedent.197
Originalist constitutional precedent creates constitutional law that
federal courts will use in future adjudications. If the constitutional
law created through the process of specification is a faithful
ascertainment and application of the Constitution’s original
meaning, then later courts should work within that constitutional
law to decide future cases.
With some constitutional texts, the need for constitutional law is
clearer than in others.198 For instance, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures.199 Assuming that the
Search and Seizure Clause is a prohibition on unreasonable
government action, the Court must create constitutional law to
specify how the Clause’s original meaning applies to different
concrete circumstances. The constitutional doctrines the Court
articulates will be applications of the Clause’s principle of
reasonableness to these concrete circumstances.
For instance, the Court announced, in the context of passenger
automobile stops for traffic violations, that a police officer “may
order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the

196. See Richardson, supra note 179, at 297 (describing how specified norms are true
specifications of the more general norms).
197. I defend this proposition in Part V.G supra; see also Strang, supra note 5 (providing
an extended defense of this proposition).
198. The Search and Seizure Clause was drawn from Article XIV of the Massachusetts’
Declaration of Rights, drafted by John Adams, who in turn drew from the Pennsylvania
constitution. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 170–71, 176–77 (1999).
The Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause was relatively novel—and hence its
original meaning is relatively hard to discern—because the Fourth Amendment was primarily
the culmination of American efforts to eliminate general warrants. Id. at 150–79. There are,
broadly speaking, two views on the original meaning of the Search and Seizure Clause: (1) the
Clause is an independent prohibition on unreasonable government action; and (2) the Clause
was a “statement of political moral principle . . . an explanation or justification for the Warrant
Clause.” THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 324 (Edwin Meese, III et al., eds.,
2005).
199. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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[traffic] stop.”200 In Maryland v. Wilson, the Court applied the
principle of reasonableness to the facts of the case and created a per
se rule that would govern future analogous cases. In so doing, the
Wilson Court relied on the earlier case of Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
which had ruled that police officers may order drivers of passenger
cars to exit their vehicles on routine traffic stops.201
Thus, the Mimms-Wilson line of cases has, through application of
the Search and Seizure Clause’s reasonableness principle, created a
rule of constitutional law. The Mimms-Wilson rule specifies how the
principle of reasonableness applies in a given context, and the
Court’s specification is authoritative in future cases with analogous
factual circumstances. Litigants in such future cases will not, absent
exceptional circumstances, make appeals directly to the Search and
Seizure Clause and instead will craft arguments based on the Court’s
precedent.
However, with other constitutional texts, the necessity of the
creation of constitutional law is less clear, but it remains nonetheless.
The Article II, § 1, cl. 4 requirement that the President “shall . . .
have attained to the age of thirty five years,” possibly the most
concrete phrase in the Constitution, provides an example.202 The age
requirement is often used by scholars as the most prominent counter
to claims by critical legal scholars that the law is indeterminate.203
The rule-ness of the age requirement itself precludes many questions
that would otherwise result in litigation and consequently precludes
the significant need for constitutional law that exists with other, less
rule-like constitutional provisions.
However, situations may still arise that call for specification of
the Presidential Age Clause and the creation of constitutional law.204
For instance, an underage plaintiff could advance the argument that
200. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997).
201. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).
202. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. There are a couple of possible, compatible reasons for
the age requirement: (1) to prevent the development of dynasties where the son of an
illustrious father achieves the presidency on the father’s merits, AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 159–64 (2005); and (2) to help ensure sufficient maturity of
presidents, see JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 758, at 540 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (“That, which has been selected,
is the middle age of life, by which period the character and talents of individuals are generally
known, and fully developed.”).
203. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 134, at 414, 420 (using this provision).
204. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 265–66 (1990)
(listing potential variations in the meaning of the age requirement).

1776

DO NOT DELETE

1729

2/1/2011 7:15 PM

An Originalist Theory of Precedent

the age requirement is more properly interpreted as a maturity
requirement, and that he is sufficiently mature.205 An originalist
judge faced with that argument would ascertain the original meaning
of the age requirement and then apply that meaning to the facts
presented by the case. In doing so, he could find that while Article
II, § 1, cl. 4 has, as one of its goals, the maturity of the President, it
uses the rule of thirty-five years of age instead of the standard of
maturity to define the requirement for the office.206 The court would
then announce a rule that the age requirement requires that the
President be thirty-five years old. In doing so, the precedent would
specify the Clause’s meaning.
Alternatively, if the hypothetical plaintiff is correct and the
original meaning of Article II, § 1, cl. 4 is a standard of maturity,
then the court would issue a decision that would guide future courts
in ascertaining whether a particular person meets the maturity
standard in Article II, § 1, cl. 4. The decision would explain why the
constitutional text prohibited or permitted the plaintiff to be
President. Either way, the court would create constitutional law that
specified the constitution’s original meaning and which would
govern future adjudications.
Today, of course, it is exceedingly rare for the Supreme Court to
face an entirely new issue of constitutional law and hence the Court’s
decisions are frequently decided on the basis of the Court’s
constitutional law. This results from the process of specification that
began with the first constitutional cases and the Court’s interpreting
and applying the original meaning, thereby creating constitutional
law. For example, in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall
relied on the nature of the judicial process to argue that, when faced
with a statute that conflicts with the Constitution, a court must
follow the Constitution.207 Marshall characterized the judicial process
as “apply[ing] the rule to particular cases” which requires a judge to
205. See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1174
(1985) (making this argument); Girardeau Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68
MINN. L. REV. 473, 532–33 (1984) (same).
Or, he could advance the claim that the age requirement in Article II was
subsequently altered by the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits irrational age discrimination.
See Anthony D’Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The “Easy Case” of the Under-Aged President,
84 NW. U. L. REV. 250, 255–56 (1989) (making this argument).
206. There is little scholarship on the original meaning of the age requirement, but what
there is indicates that the age requirement is not susceptible of the maturity interpretation.
207. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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“expound and interpret that rule.”208 The judicial process described
by Marshall is one of specification. Judges determine the meaning of
the Constitution, apply that meaning to the case at hand, and in
doing so create constitutional law.
The Interpretative Approach directs judges to give presumptive
deference to originalist precedent that specifies constitutional
meaning. This respects the originalist precedent’s good faith
articulation and application of the original meaning, thereby
preserving the epistemic work performed by the precedent.
2. Bringing to light implicit constitutional norms
Much of the Constitution’s original meaning is relatively patent;
many of its norms are fairly obvious. To ascertain the original
meaning in such cases does not require significant research or
judgment. An example of such a patent originalist norm is the
Coinage Clause, which authorizes Congress to “coin money.”209 It is
clear that this provision’s original meaning grants Congress at least
the authority to issue legal tender in the form of “metallic tokens.”210
However, even when the Constitution’s original meaning is
metaphysically and epistemically determinate, it often requires
significant research and judgment to articulate that meaning. In
these cases, the Constitution’s original meaning is implicit and
originalist precedent makes explicit—brings to light—that original
meaning.
The Second Amendment’s protection of an individual right to
keep and bear arms is an instance of this.211 It is not manifest that the
Second Amendment’s original meaning protects an individual rather
208. Id.
209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
210. See Robert G. Natelson, Paper Money and the Original Understanding of the Coinage
Clause, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1017, 1061 (2008) (“The more common meaning of
‘coin’ in the eighteenth century, as now, referred to metallic tokens.”). For discussions on the
original meaning of the Coinage Clause, see id. (arguing that the Clause’s original meaning
included congressional authority to print paper money); Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender
Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367, 389 (“[I]t is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
Framers intended to prohibit [the] use [of paper money].”); Claire Priest, Currency Policies
and Legal Development in Colonial New England, 110 YALE L.J. 1303, 1398 n.358 (2001)
(“It is uncontroversial that the Framers did not view the Constitution as giving Congress the
power to issue paper money to be invested with the status of legal tender.”); Strang, supra
note 5, at 475 (“There is a strong scholarly consensus that Congress was not authorized by
this provision to issue paper money.”).
211. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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than collective right. Indeed, it was not until the early-1980s that
significant support for the individual right interpretation of the
Amendment—labeled the Standard Model—arose.212 By the mid1990s, however, the Standard Model had become, as the label
suggests, the consensus interpretation.213 Thereafter, the Supreme
Court, in District of Columbia v. Heller, in an originalist opinion,214
made explicit the implicit original meaning of the Second
Amendment by ruling that it protected an individual right.215
This same phenomenon occurs in ethics. Returning again to the
Aristotelian tradition, some ethical propositions are patent, while
others are implicit.216 According to Aquinas, for instance, the first
principle of natural law—do good and avoid evil217—is per se nota, or
self-evident.218 There are a host of other natural law norms that are
also manifest.219
However, there are many implicit norms. These are norms the
full explication of which took thought, argumentation, and time. For
example, the Aristotelian tradition articulated the norm that it is
“just to charge interest on a loan”220 after centuries of discussion.221

212. It is likely that the first modern scholarship to strongly support the Standard Model
was Kates, supra note 149.
213. See Barnett & Kates, supra note 149, at 1141 (“Research conducted through the
1980s has led legal scholars and historians to conclude, sometimes reluctantly, but with virtual
unanimity, that there is no tenable textual or historical argument against a broad individual
right view of the Second Amendment.”).
214. See Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 2008, at A13 (“Justice Scalia’s opinion is the finest example of what is now called
‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”).
215. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
216. See I-II AQUINAS, supra note 57, Q. 94, art. 4 (“[T]he natural law, as to general
principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge.”).
217. Id., Q. 94, art. 2 (“Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and
pursued, and evil is to be avoided.”).
218. See id. (“[T]he precepts of the natural law are . . . self-evident principles.”); JOHN
FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 126–29 (1998) (explaining
another self-evident proposition of natural law, that “‘one should love one’s neighbor as
oneself’”); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 29–32 (1980) (explaining the
concept of self-evident propositions of natural law).
219. See I-II AQUINAS, supra note 57, Q. 94, art. 2 (giving self-preservation, procreation,
and practical reason as examples of self-evidently good goods).
220. 2 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 833
(1993).
221. For a review of the history surrounding what constitutes usury see JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY (1957); JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra
note 142, at 181–94.
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This norm was implicit in the tradition’s broader philosophical
commitments.222 After significant thought, argumentation, and time,
this ethical norm was made explicit in the tradition.223
The Constitution’s original meaning will frequently not be
apparent for a number of reasons. First, the data upon which to
make a determination of what the original meaning is may be
difficult to access or, if accessible, may present other obstacles such as
an unmanageably large amount of data.224 Second, the factual
situations that would provide an opportunity to make explicit the
implicit norm may not have arisen or been presented. Third, the
cultural, political, and economic environment may make the search
for or articulation of implicit constitutional norms imprudent or not
well received.225
The Interpretative Approach directs judges to give originalist
precedent that brings to light implicit constitutional norms
presumptive respect. This respects the originalist precedent’s good
faith articulation of the implicit original meaning norm, thereby
preserving the precedent’s epistemic work.
3. Resolving perceived tensions in the original meaning
Originalist precedent resolves perceived tensions between
constitutional norms by identifying, in a particular case, which of a
stable of possibly governing norms in fact governs the outcome of
the case.
The norms embodied in the Constitution’s original meaning
have focal cases.226 Given the care with which the Framers drafted
222. See FINNIS, AQUINAS, supra note 218, at 207 (stating that two principles supported
charging reasonable interest: the cost to the lender of sharing the borrower’s risk, and the
harm to the lender in the form of expenses and losses, including opportunity costs).
223. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 142, at 193 (“Over five centuries there
emerges a moral doctrine of precise definitions and distinctions, of narrowly limited solutions
and well-reasoned arguments.”).
224. Although, as mentioned earlier, today’s more-readily accessible historical materials
and computer assisted research tools have diminished these obstacles.
225. For example, for many years, and to a lesser though still significant degree today, the
legal academy dismissed originalist arguments. Therefore, a scholar would lose standing in the
academy if the scholar took originalist arguments seriously and sought to articulate the
Constitution’s original meaning.
226. See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 218, at 9–11 (describing the concept of
focal cases). The focal case is the mechanism used to distinguish “the mature from the
undeveloped in human affairs, the sophisticated from the primitive, the flourishing from the
corrupt, the fine specimen from the deviate case, the ‘straightforwardly’, ‘simply speaking’
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the Constitution, it is unlikely that the focal cases of original
meaning norms conflict. However, as one extends out from the focal
case, it becomes more difficult to ascertain whether the norm
governs a particular case. When aspects of two or more of the
Constitution’s norms beyond their respective focal cases plausibly
apply to the same matter, a perceived tension between the norms
exists. Originalist precedent resolves that perceived tension.
A famous instance of resolving perceived tensions was between
the Bankruptcy Clause227 and the Contracts Clause,228 and the longstanding state practice of bankruptcy and insolvency laws. On the
one hand, the Bankruptcy Clause authorized Congress to establish
“uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies,”229 and the Contracts
Clause prohibited states from passing laws “impairing the Obligation
of Contracts.”230 On the other hand, following adoption of the
Constitution, states continued to pass bankruptcy and insolvency
laws that applied to pre-existing debts.231 Many Americans before,
during, and following Ratification of the Constitution, plausibly
argued that the Bankruptcy and Contracts Clauses prohibited states
from passing such legislation.
The Supreme Court resolved the perceived tension in two cases:
Sturges v. Crowninshield232 and Ogden v. Saunders.233 First, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, the Sturges Court ruled that states
could not pass bankruptcy and insolvency laws that discharged preexisting debts.234 Later, in Ogden, the Court ruled that state
bankruptcy and insolvency laws that discharged debts incurred after
passage of the laws were constitutional.235
The Court in both cases reviewed the text and history of the
Clauses in a good faith articulation and application of the original

(simpliciter), and ‘without qualification’ from the ‘in a sense’, ‘in a manner of speaking’, and
‘in a way’ (secundum quid).” Id. at 10–11. For a description of the similar concept of paradigm
cases see RUBENFELD, supra note 60, at 178–95.
227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
229. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
231. PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY,
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607–1900, at 31–36 (1974).
232. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
233. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
234. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 197–208.
235. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 213.
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meaning.236 Sturges and Ogden receive significant respect under the
Interpretative Approach because they are evidence of how the
Constitution’s original meaning is not in tension. This preserves the
interpretative work performed by the Supreme Court.
This same phenomenon of perceived tension occurs in ethics
with ethical norms.237 In fact, one of the most powerful challenges to
ethical theories is describing how to either avoid or resolve prima
facie conflicts between ethical norms.238 Different philosophical
traditions have arrived at different mechanisms to resolve perceived
tensions between ethical norms. In the Aristotelian tradition, for
instance, many perceived tensions that arise between natural law
norms directing an individual toward integral human fulfillment are
usually viewed as just that, perceived but not true conflicts. In other
words, there is frequently a right answer to the ethical question.239
Over time, the tradition has addressed many perceived tensions.
One of the most profound tensions, one that has received sustained
attention in the Aristotelian tradition, is that between the obligation
to tell the truth and the obligation to avoid harming others that
arises, for example, when one is asked to disclose information that
will lead to the unjust treatment of another.240 More specifically, this
occurs when an agent from an unjust regime asks a homeowner to
disclose whether a fugitive is in the homeowner’s house. The
homeowner knows that the fugitive is in the house and that, if that
fact is disclosed, the regime will treat the fugitive unjustly.
Members of the Aristotelian tradition, over centuries, focused on
this perceived tension. Today, the tradition has concluded that the
homeowner must not disclose the location of the fugitive.241 It
thereby resolved the perceived tension. Members of that tradition
give this conclusion—this resolution of the perceived tension—
significant respect.
236. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 197–207; Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 215.
237. See Miller, supra note 142, at 1015–16 (describing conflict between ethical norms).
238. See Arras, supra note 175, at 995–96 (describing the challenge to ethics posed by
conflicting ethical principles); Richardson, supra note 179, at 284–90 (describing and
criticizing the dominant methods of resolving concrete ethical problems).
239. See 1 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: CHRISTIAN MORAL
PRINCIPLES 98 (reprint ed., 1997) (“[T]he created order of things embodies meanings and
values placed there by a wise and loving creator.”).
240. See JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 142, at 195–215 (describing the tradition’s
grappling with the perceived conflict).
241. Id. at 213.
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The Interpretative Approach directs judges to give presumptive
respect to originalist precedent that resolves perceived tensions in the
original meaning. This presumption respects the originalist
precedent’s good faith articulation and application of the original
meaning, and thereby preserves the precedent’s epistemic work.
4. Embedding the Constitution’s original meaning
Originalist precedent embeds the Constitution’s original
meaning in the Supreme Court’s constitutional law. The process of
embodying the original meaning in case law protects and defends
that meaning.
It does so in a number of ways. First, case law puts the Court’s
institutional prestige behind the original meaning. The Court’s
originalist precedent carries with it both the respect for the
Constitution’s original meaning and the Court’s own, independent
weight. Second, the original meaning is protected by the Court’s
reasoned explanation of the reasons behind it.242 Frequently, in
explaining itself in its opinion, the Court provides reasons why the
result reached by the Court—in accordance with the original
meaning—is substantively good.243 Articulating why the original
meaning is good ensures wider support for it. The Court has also
argued, on occasion, why, even though the original meaning is not
ideal, it is better to follow that meaning rather than create a different
meaning.244
Embedding the Constitution’s original meaning in originalist
precedent protects that meaning from alteration. This is valuable
because the original meaning itself is valuable: it generally resolves
coordination problems in a manner superior to judicial coordination,
the most commonly proposed alternative.245 Embedding the original

242. See Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 17, at 882
(noting the common practice by the Court of giving normative arguments in favor of its
conclusion).
243. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63–69 (2004) (arguing that the
Confrontation Clause’s original meaning is superior to nonoriginalist interpretations); U.S. v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564–68 (1995) (arguing that limiting Congress to a Commerce Clause
power more in line with the Clause’s original meaning would have the good effects of
maintaining our federal system and preventing overcentralization).
244. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202–03
(1989).
245. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good
Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1737–51 (2010) (arguing that “judicial updating” of the
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meaning also advances Rule of Law values such as stability of the
law.
Embedding the Constitution’s original meaning is an important
aspect of the Interpretative Approach. The embedded original
meaning permits it to better perform its function of preserving the
epistemic work accomplished by the precedent.
C. Constitutional Construction
1. Introduction
This section describes how originalist precedent in the context of
constitutional construction receives respect via both the Constructive
and Interpretative Approaches. Originalist precedent in the context
of constitutional construction plays the same roles as precedent in
the context of constitutional interpretation. In addition, it also
creates constitutional meaning which has gravitational effect on
other areas of constructed constitutional law.
2. Creating defeasible constitutional meaning
The roles played by originalist precedent in the context of
constitutional interpretation are also played by originalist precedent
in constitutional construction: specifying constitutional meaning,
bringing to light implicit constitutional norms, resolving perceived
tensions in the original meaning, and embedding the Constitution’s
original meaning. There are three significant differences, however.
First, originalist precedent in the context of construction resolves
original indeterminacy. Second, the constructed constitutional
meaning is defeasible by the elected branches. Third, originalist
precedent that constructs constitutional law has a gravitational effect
on other areas of (constructed) constitutional law. I will address each
difference, in turn.
Constitutional construction occurs when the outcome of a case is
indeterminate. It occurs in two fashions: first, when the
Constitution’s original meaning is metaphysically determinate but
epistemically indeterminate; and second, when the Constitution’s

Constitution leads to worse results than following the Constitution’s original meaning); see also
Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 105 (1989) (describing the
deepest flaw of nonoriginalist methodologies as “mak[ing] law the product not of mind, but of
accident”).
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original meaning is both metaphysically and epistemically
indeterminate. In the former category, the Interpretative Approach
applies; in the latter category, the Constructive Approach applies. I
first explain why this is the case, and then I describe in more detail
the unique aspects of the Constructive Approach.
The Interpretative Approach applies to metaphysically
determinate but epistemically indeterminate cases because, as I
described more fully above,246 the Constitution’s original meaning is
determinate. There is an obstacle—perhaps permanent, perhaps
temporary—to the interpreter’s access to that determinate original
meaning. Until such time as the metaphysically determinate original
meaning is accessible, the originalist precedent will play the epistemic
role of providing evidence of the original meaning and will receive
significant respect for that reason.
Originalist precedent governed by the Constructive Approach,
by contrast, in addition to providing evidence of the Constitution’s
(indeterminate) original meaning, also creates determinate—though
defeasible—original meaning.247 These precedents are entitled to
significant respect because they create the legal norm that
coordinates social activity. Until a later Court determines that the
originalist precedent should be overruled, it is the governing
constitutional law.
Second, the originalist precedent’s construction of constitutional
law is, as I just suggested, defeasible. Though there is significant
disagreement on this point,248 my tentative conclusion is that
originalist precedent that constructs constitutional law is subject to
defeasance by the elected branches.249 Therefore, if the Court at
Time X constructed Meaning 1, and Congress passed a statute that is
constitutional only under Meaning not-1, then Congress has
reconstructed the Constitution’s meaning. So, in a case at Time Y

246. See supra Part IV.D.
247. See Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response to Farber
and Gerhardt, supra note 5, at 1235 (acknowledging that precedent can “fix[]” the
Constitution’s meaning, at least in the case of ambiguity).
248. See id. (stating that precedent that “resolve[s] latent ambiguities in the text by
‘fixing’ its meaning” is not defeasible and instead is subject to change only via constitutional
amendment).
249. I have elsewhere defended this position. See Strang, supra note 120, at 70–72
(supporting this claim). I followed Keith Whittington on this point. See Whittington, supra
note 25, at 11 (“The judiciary should not prop up old constructions that are no longer
politically authoritative.”).
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involving the constitutionality of the statute, the Court should adopt
Meaning not-1 (so long as it is consistent with what is known about
the original meaning).
The third difference is the gravitational force of precedent
subject to the Constructive Approach. Gravitational force is the
power of cases and the legal principles they instantiate to influence
the law around them, including later cases.250 Originalist precedent
that constructs constitutional meaning is analogous to common law
adjudication because, in both, the courts are creatively articulating
law. In both, the law is that body of legal rules and principles that
best fits and justifies the legal practice.251 The legal principles in both
influence the law—exert gravitational force.
Originalist precedents that do not construct constitutional law
do not have gravitational force because they do not create the
governing legal principles. Instead, the Constitution’s determinate
original meaning provides those legal principles, and originalist
precedent instantiates them.
D. Preliminary Response to the “New Doctrinalists”
I intend the conception of originalist precedent I offer here to be
a partial252 response to the claims made by scholars known as the
New Doctrinalists.253 The New Doctrinalists are a group of scholars
who have revived focus on the Supreme Court’s legal doctrine.
Two key points advanced by the New Doctrinalists are: (1) there
is a distinction between propositions about the Constitution’s
meaning and propositions implementing or putting into effect the
Constitution’s meaning254; and (2) there is a permissible disparity

250. See DWORKIN, supra note 81, at 111–17 (describing gravitational force).
251. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 230–31, 254–58 (1986) (explaining his fit
and justification conception of law).
252. In a future article, I hope to more directly address the New Doctrinalists’ claims.
253. The most prominent New Doctrinalists are Professors Mitchell Berman, Richard
Fallon, and Kermit Roosevelt. Brannon Denning has taken the New Doctrinalists’ suggestions
and applied them to the Dormant Commerce Clause in an insightful article. Brannon P.
Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
417 (2008). For a critique of the New Doctrinalists see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 173 (2006).
254. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes
What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1652 (2005) (“[T]here is a distinction between
the Constitution itself and the rules that courts apply in deciding cases.”).

1786

DO NOT DELETE

1729

2/1/2011 7:15 PM

An Originalist Theory of Precedent

between these two sorts of propositions.255 New Doctrinalist scholars
argue that these two key points are not only an accurate description
of our practice256; they claim that these points are necessary to any
plausible theory of constitutional interpretation.257
In this Article, I showed that originalism, with the Interpretative
and Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent, preserves
a significant place for constitutional doctrine. First, constitutional
doctrine is expressed in originalist precedents, and then this doctrine,
so long as the presumption in its favor remains unrebutted, governs
later cases. In this way, originalism fits the descriptive claim of the
New Doctrinalists that constitutional doctrine is a central facet of
our legal practice.
I also established that, at least in the context of constitutional
interpretation, there is no disparity between the constitutional
doctrine thus created and the Constitution’s governing original
meaning. Instead, doctrine is the method of making express the
Constitution’s meaning in particular contexts. There is a trivial
disparity in the sense that the doctrine does not simply repeat the
canonical form of the Constitution’s meaning. But that is true any
time a practical norm is applied to concrete activity. The doctrine
states that when such-and-such is the case, the governing
constitutional meaning requires such-and-such an outcome. At least
with issues of constitutional interpretation, therefore, the New
Doctrinalists’ claim that a disparity between meaning and doctrine is
necessary, is overblown.
However, in the context of constitutional construction, the New
Doctrinalists’ arguments have real traction. I showed that the
Supreme Court is genuinely creative when it constructs
constitutional meaning. This leads to a gap between the determinate
constitutional meaning and constitutional doctrine constructed by

255. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1317 (2006) (proposing the “permissible disparity
thesis”).
256. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004)
(arguing that “the single most conspicuous” aspect of constitutional judicial review is the
“judge-made tests of constitutional law that are not most fairly understood as themselves
products of judicial constitutional interpretation”); see also Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 17, at 883 (“[I]n practice constitutional law generally
has little to do with the text. Most of the time, in deciding a constitutional issue, the text plays
only a nominal role.”).
257. FALLON, supra note 7, at 37–42.
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the Court. The disparity between constitutional meaning and
doctrine in the context of construction is necessary: in a situation
where the Constitution’s meaning alone would not resolve a case,
the Court must construct meaning that is substantively different
from the Constitution’s meaning.
E. Preliminary Note on the Scope of Originalist Precedent258
Most originalist scholars agree that federal court judgments are
binding on all three branches of the federal government259 (in
addition to state actors).260 There is a vigorous originalist debate over
whether federal judicial power also makes federal court opinions
explaining judgments binding on the legislative and executive
branches.261 At this point in my research, however, I have not
determined whether my conception of originalist precedent includes
only case judgments or whether it also includes explanatory
opinions.262

258. I also do not address the extent to which Congress may revise constitutional
precedent. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 804 (arguing that Congress does
have that power).
259. See Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretative Supremacy, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 1539, 1561 (2005) (stating that “the majority of scholars support judicial
supremacy”).
260. The notable exception is Michael Stokes Paulsen, who has powerfully argued that
each branch of the federal government has independent interpretative authority. Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to Professors Levinson and
Eisgruber, 83 GEO. L.J. 385 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993).
261. See John Harrison, Judicial Interpretative Finality and the Constitutional Text, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 33, 37 (2006) (finding that federal court judgments are binding, but not
opinions); Edwin Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 981-89 (1987)
(arguing that federal court interpretations were not binding on the executive branch); Prakash
& Yoo, supra note 259 at 1561–62 (arguing that only federal court judgments are binding
precedent); see also Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997) (defending the supremacy of judicial
opinions on nonoriginalist grounds); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law
and as Explanations for Judgment, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 44 (1993) (arguing, based on
nonoriginalist considerations, that only federal court judgments are binding).
262. See Solum, supra note 5, at 186–89 (distinguishing between realist and formalist
views of stare decisis).
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VII. THE INTERPRETATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES ARE
MORE NORMATIVELY ATTRACTIVE THAN ALTERNATIVE
CONCEPTIONS OF ORIGINALIST PRECEDENT
A. Introduction
All else being equal, a more normatively attractive originalism is
preferable to a less attractive conception of originalism. For this
reason, the most prominent originalists have offered originalist
theories of interpretation that are, from the perspective of those
committed to their respective philosophical traditions, normatively
attractive. Randy Barnett provides an example of this because he
argues that his originalism, with its libertarian reading of the
Constitution’s original meaning and its presumption of liberty, leads
to the greatest protection of natural rights.263 Similarly, the
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches increase originalism’s
normative attractiveness and are preferable to other conceptions of
originalist precedent.
B. The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches to Originalist
Precedent are more Normatively Attractive than other Conceptions
As I noted above, broadly speaking there are three plausible
conceptions on the role of originalist precedent: (1) “get rid of it
all”; (2) the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches; and (3)
“common law constitutionalism.” The “get rid of it all”264
conception is unattractive for a number of reasons.265 First, it
diverges significantly from current practice: it fails to fit our legal
practice.266 In law, fit is itself a powerful normative criterion.267 This
conception’s failure to fit therefore strongly counts against it.
263. BARNETT, supra note 3, at 109; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 25, at 110–59
(grounding originalism in popular sovereignty); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at
802–05) (arguing that originalism is justified because it protects the good consequences that
arise from the Constitution’s supermajority requirements); Strang, supra note 25, at 983–97
(2005) (using the Aristotelian tradition’s concept of human flourishing to justify originalism).
Lawrence Solum has also argued that a version of originalism, what he calls Semantic
Originalism, is compatible with most normative justifications for originalism. See Solum, supra
note 11, at 128–34.
264. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
265. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 848–49 (arguing against the “get rid of
it all” conception).
266. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 883–84 (noting that precedent and constitutional
doctrine make up a significant portion of argument in constitutional cases).
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Second, under the “get rid of it all” conception, originalist
precedent does not serve the epistemic and constructive roles I
outlined above when describing the Interpretative and Constructive
Approaches toward originalist precedent.268 The “get rid of it all”
conception, therefore, cannot claim the benefits that come with the
Interpretative and Constructive Approaches. It cannot, for instance,
take advantage of the efficiency that derives from the presumption
that originalist precedent controls later cases.
Third, there is harm to Rule of Law values caused by the “get rid
of it all” conception. Many critics of originalism have argued that
adoption of the “get rid of it all” conception would lead to legal
instability as the law has an increased chance of change and in fact
does change more frequently, both of which undermine stability in
and reliance on the law.269 While I think that these criticisms are
overstated,270 often as a way of trying generally to discredit
originalism,271 it is true that the “get rid of it all” conception will
protect Rule of Law values less well than the Interpretative and
Constructive Approaches.
For instance, the presumption of correctness under the
Interpretative Approach makes it less likely that originalist precedent
will be challenged and, consequently, less likely to be overruled (or
modified in some other way, such as narrowed). The “get rid of it
all” conception, by comparison, without the presumption, invites
litigants and judges to reevaluate both a precedent’s articulation of
the Constitution’s original meaning and its application. I argued
above that both of these operations frequently place heavy burdens
on human judgment and that, therefore, reasonable judges (and
litigants) could and would plausibly come to different conclusions.

267. See Lee J. Strang, Damages as the Appropriate Remedy for “Abuse” of an Easement:
Moving Toward Consistency, Efficiency, and Fairness in Property Law, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV.
933, 947–50 (2008) (explaining why fit is a powerful normative argument in law).
268. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 848–49.
269. See Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1173, 1177–80 (2006) (listing the Rule of Law values served by stare decisis for the purpose
of criticizing originalism); Strauss, supra note 17, at 925–28 (arguing that common law
constitutionalism constrains judges more than originalism).
270. See Calabresi, supra note 36, at 956–57 (arguing that the Rule of Law criticism of
originalism is weak).
271. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 1232 (arguing that originalism’s critics, who use stare
decisis to condemn originalism, do so to protect cases whose substantive results the critics
prefer).
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The pragmatic result is a higher likelihood of change in the law and
harm to Rule of Law values.
To make the costs of the “get rid of it all” conception more
concrete, it is helpful to hypothesize how it would adversely impact a
federal appellate court judge’s job. Imagine an originalist federal
appellate court judge presiding over a case in which the judge must
decide a question on the Constitution’s meaning. To avoid issues of
vertical stare decisis,272 assume further that the question is not one
that the Supreme Court’s precedent answers.273 There is, however,
applicable originalist circuit court precedent.274
Appellate court judges—and all federal judges, to a greater or
lesser extent—are under tremendous pressure to efficiently
adjudicate their crushing case load.275 The “get rid of it all”
conception would make federal appellate judges’ jobs unmanageable.
Judges and litigants would have to reevaluate every possible
constitutional issue, regardless of how settled the issue.276 Daniel
Farber explained how this would play out in the context of the First
Amendment:
It is simply unworkable to leave everything up for grabs all of the
time. Imagine if, in every First Amendment case, the lawyers had to
reargue basic questions such as whether the First Amendment
applies to the states or whether it covers nonpolitical speech (both
of which have been debated by scholars). Every brief would have to
be a treatise, arguing every point of First Amendment doctrine
from scratch. Moreover, different judges could adopt completely
different First Amendment theories, so a lawyer in a case before the
Supreme Court might have to write nine different briefs based on
inconsistent theories of the Constitution. Similarly, dialogue
between the Justices themselves would be stymied because they

272. Vertical stare decisis is the bindingness of precedent by a higher court on a lower
court.
273. A possible example of this is the legal question of whether the Second Amendment
protected an individual right to keep and bear arms prior to the Supreme Court’s District of
Columbia v. Heller decision.
274. Continuing with the Second Amendment example, prior to Heller, a number of
circuits had ruled on the Second Amendment’s meaning vis-à-vis an individual right.
275. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FED. JUDICIAL CASELOAD: MAR. 31, 2009
(2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2009/front/IndicatorsMar09.pdf.
276. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 892 (explaining the “common-sense notion that one
reason for following precedent is that it is simply too time consuming and difficult to
reexamine everything from the ground up”).
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would be operating within different conceptual frameworks. Unless
most issues can be regarded as settled most of the time, coherent
discussion is simply impossible. Surely “it would overtax the Court
and the country alike to insist . . . that everything always must be
up for grabs at once.”277

In each case that raises a constitutional issue, the judge would be
obliged to take up the often time-consuming task of first, uncovering
the Constitution’s applicable original meaning and second, engaging
in that often just-as-difficult task of applying the original meaning to
the questions presented in the case. Judges simply do not have the
time to do this.
More fundamentally though, as I argued above, the correct
application of the Constitution’s original meaning is one that we
may expect, in many cases—and despite diligent, good faith effort—
will coexist with reasonable disagreement. Consequently, the “get
rid of it all” conception of originalist precedent would result in a
significant amount of inconsistent precedent.
The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches, by contrast,
avoid these costs while preserving originalism as a viable theory of
interpretation. The originalist judge following the Interpretative and
Constructive Approaches toward originalist precedent will give
precedent significant respect, which accords with our legal practice.
The judge’s—and litigants’—work will therefore be more efficient
because they need not revisit all possible questions of constitutional
meaning and application. The Interpretative and Constructive
Approaches’ significant respect for originalist precedent protects the
Rule of Law values stare decisis serves.
The “common law constitutionalism” conception avoids the
costs of the “get rid of it all” conception, but it does so at the
expense of originalism itself. The “common law constitutionalism”
conception fully embraces stare decisis and the Rule of Law values it
advances. Binding legal norms, embodied in the Supreme Court’s
precedent, will remain authoritative, and hence the interests of
reliance built up around those norms are protected. Proponents of
this position also argue that it increases stability of the law,278 and
achieves greater fairness.279 Advocates of this position therefore avoid
277. Farber, supra note 269, at 1177–78 (citations omitted).
278. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 926–27 (arguing that, unlike precedent, originalism is
relatively unconstraining on judges).
279. Healy, supra note 34, at 1214.
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the pitfalls of the “get rid of it all” conception. This is a significant
accomplishment.
Unfortunately, it comes at an unacceptable cost, especially if, as I
have shown, the Interpretative and Constructive Approaches can
preserve most of what makes the “common law constitutionalism”
conception attractive.280 The cost of the “common law
constitutionalism” conception is the near-total, and in many cases
total, abandonment of originalism.281 According to the “common
law constitutionalism” conception, originalist precedent is protected
by a near-irrebuttable presumption. Thus, a precedent that, for
instance, later research strongly suggests incorrectly articulated the
original meaning, would remain viable. Over time, constitutional
adjudication would ever more deviate from the Constitution’s
original meaning, leaving it a relic, unimportant to legal questions
which are settled on the basis of precedent.282
This eventuality is tellingly parallel to our current legal practice
where nearly all areas of constitutional law are significantly
influenced by or, in many instances, dominated by precedent at odds
with the Constitution’s original meaning.283 It is not controversial
that our current practice is largely nonoriginalist.284 Only in the event
of historical accident, such as that which occurred in District of
Columbia v. Heller, does the Constitution’s original meaning play a
significant role.
The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches toward
originalist precedent offer a better option. They preserve much of
our current practice including, most importantly, a robust doctrine
of stare decisis. At the same time, they ensure that the Constitution’s
original meaning remains meaningful. Originalist precedent has
weight in later courts’ analyses only if it meets the requirements of
280. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 849–50 (explaining why the “common
law constitutionalism conception” is less attractive than a middle-of-the-road approach like
mine).
281. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 899, 906 (concluding that while common law
constitutionalism cannot “[e]xplicitly” overrule the text, it can produce “creative”
interpretations).
282. Id. at 883.
283. See id. at 884 (stating that legal change has been largely not text-based).
284. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of
Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB.
L. REV. 671, 674–75 (1995) (finding that, because of the “Supreme Court’s present style of
constitutional discourse,” the Constitution has been rendered “very nearly unintelligible” to
the People).
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OGF—only so long as the presumption that protects it remains
unrebutted. The precedent therefore remains open to challenge and
the Constitution’s original meaning remains the governing body of
norms in our legal practice. This means that originalism retains
viability in a way that it does not under the “common law
constitutionalism” conception.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have shown that originalism preserves a
substantial role for originalist precedent using the Interpretative and
Constructive Approaches. Precedent that meets the test of OGF—
that is an objectively good faith attempt to articulate and apply the
Constitution’s original meaning—is originalist precedent. I have
illustrated how judges would use originalist precedent in
constitutional interpretation and construction. I have also shown
that originalist precedent receives significant respect under the
Interpretative Approach because it provides evidence of the
Constitution’s original meaning by specifying that meaning in
concrete cases, bringing to light implicit constitutional norms, and
resolving perceived tensions in the original meaning. Further,
originalist precedent receives significant respect under the
Constructive Approach because it constructs constitutional law,
again by specifying that meaning in concrete cases, bringing to light
implicit constitutional norms, and resolving perceived tensions in the
original meaning. It also exerts gravitational force on other areas of
law.
The Interpretative and Constructive Approaches enable judges to
meet their Article III obligation to give precedent significant respect,
and do so in a more normatively attractive way than other
conceptions of originalist precedent by avoiding the temptation to
reject precedent altogether, which is incompatible with our legal
tradition, and by avoiding the dangers of giving too strong a
presumption to originalist precedent that has drifted too far from
original constitutional meaning.
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